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1. Introduction 
The Introduction will cover the motivation and foundation for the project. It includes the 
Problem Field (1.1), directly followed by the corresponding Problem Formulation (1.2.) and 
an explanation hereof. 
 
1.1 Problem Field
1
 
During the last 50 years we have experienced an increasingly globalised world, when 
referring to globalisation as “…an expansion of economic activities across national 
boundaries.” (Nayyar 2006: 137). Such activities can be observed through the increased 
world trade between 1950-2004, with an annual growth of 5.9 %, movement of capital, 
foreign direct investments (FDI) from Trans National Companies, etc. A part of this growth 
can be explained by a remarkable decrease in transportation and communication costs 
(Hummels 2007: 131; Bruff 2005: 263). All these factors strengthened interdependence of 
states (and other actors) thereby making it disadvantageous for states to go it alone (Bruff 
2005: 263). Globalisation has integrated the whole world so that workforce and companies no 
longer belong to a certain geographical location. To a certain extent, it has become easier to 
move the production location to pursue a higher profit. Additionally, globalisation has given 
manufacturing companies the possibility to outsource different processes in their production 
cycle in order to maximize their profits – often due to rising wages in the original production 
area (Silver 2003: 47). An example hereof is the American automotive producer, General 
Motors (GM), which moved its production out of the American city Flint (where the 
company first had developed) due to rising wages and unionization of workers demanding 
improved working conditions, to rural areas within the US which still had lower wages than 
in Flint. However, after an agreement with United Auto Workers, all plants were unionized 
and GM began looking outside the US to Europe for new production locations (Silver 2003: 
49). This is just one out of many examples of companies looking outside state borders for 
cheaper production locations. “Capital moved from established locations – usually with a 
joint work force – to areas with less cooperation between workers.”, therefore more favoured 
for industrial expansion (and thereby establishing a new working class) (Silver 2003: 47). 
Consequently, the globalised world has had a significant impact on how, where and when 
companies produce their commodities (Nayyar 2006: 137).  
                                                 
1 Note: During the first few week of the project-work, the group consisted of 4 group members. However, 
Adeyemi Badero Taymos left group, but the project does not include any of his work, prior to the spilt up. 
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This tendency has not only been traced in the Western part of the world, but every time the 
production cost rises at the ‘new’ location another ‘new’ location is found. GM did not only 
move their production to Europe, but later also expanded the production to China (Silver 
2003: 49; Sturgeon 2011: 196). The move to China was seen as controversial due to China 
being a communist country. However, the interest in the Chinese market is not a new 
phenomenon. This amazement began centuries prior to the significance of low wages and 
cheap production sites for businesses. “In the thirteenth century, Marco Polo described the 
country with unrestrained awe; in the fifteenth century, Christopher Columbus set out from 
Europe to bring home its bounty; in the eighteenth century, the emergent British Empire 
looked on China as the ultimate destination for its maritime trade routes.” (Studwell 2002: 
IX). Now, in the last decades of the 20
th
 century till the present time, our eyes are once again 
turned towards China. The ‘renewed’ interest was in particular strengthened with the opening 
of the Chinese market. After Mao Zedong’s death (China’s communist leader from 1949-
1976), Deng Xiaoping, who came to power in China in 1978, wanted to include China in the 
international economy (Studwell 2002: XV, 26). And, “Thirty years of socialism left a 
powerful state-authority to drive the processes of ‘reform and open’ policies forward.” (Chan 
2009: 134). The first step was to give peasants a little economic freedom, by letting them sell 
parts of their crops outside the state plan. Additionally, the government began to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and, very surprisingly, China could do this without 
democratisation as what had happened in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Rithmire 
2013: 2). In 1978 Deng created four experimental special economic zones (SEZ's
2
) on the 
coast near Hong Kong. These zones helped foreign investors by offering: "…preferential 
policies for foreign investors such as lower tax rates, streamlined approval processes, and 
exemptions from foreign exchange regulations, among other benefits" (Rithmire 2013: 2). 
These zones were such a success that 14 more zones were created on the coast. In 2004 China 
had over 7,000 zones and multiple cities competed to attract FDI (ibid). Deng’s attempt to 
include China in the world economy has, among others, contributed to an average annual 
growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 8% since the late 1970s (knoema.com). 
 
                                                 
2 SEZs and EPZs be used intertwined in the project. ILO defines an EPZ as :  "as industrial zones with special 
incentives set up to attract foreign investors, in which imported materials undergo some degree of processing 
before being re-exported" (Fu & Gao 2007: 3). Out of an EPZ ILO define three main types: Special Economic 
Zones, Industrial Free Zones and Enterprise Zones. The last two (and some other sub types) are called 
Development Zones in China (ILO n.d..) 
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Today, China plays an important role in the world production and trade. In 2014 the export 
was at $1.252 trillion and China became the world's largest exporter (CIA World Factbook 
2015) China has a number of advantages, such as low-cost labour, a large market (20 % of 
the world’s population) and the SEZs, which makes this destination more attractive for 
investors over other countries seeking for FDI (Thun 2011: 366; Kaplinsky & Messner 2008: 
198).  
 
Due to China’s increasing role internationally, is it interested to examine China’s recent 
development through established economic development theories as Import Substitution 
Industrialisation and Export Substitution Industrialisation. Though, what the project group 
also finds interesting is what this development has led to with regards to China’s role in the 
world. But how can you categorise a country in the world? Immanuel Wallerstein’s attempt 
through World-System Theory (WST) categorises nations into core, semi-periphery and 
periphery nations, which can give us an idea of China as a whole. Moreover, it is also 
interesting to explore how internally diverse China is from the perspective of WST, and these 
facts have led to the following problem formulation.  
 
1.1.1. Map of China  
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1.2 Problem formulation 
How can you categorise China by means of the World-System Theory, and how is it possible 
to apply the World-System Theory on an intra-state level within China?  
 
1.3 Explanation of the Problem Formulation 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s (2005) World-System Theory (WST) is used to relate nations to each 
other, categorising them as either core, semi-periphery or periphery nations. The first 
segment of the Problem Formulation examines what category China belongs. The second, 
however, regards whether or not it is possible to apply an inter-state level theory (cf. 3.1 
World-System Theory) to an intra-state level, which in our case is China. Specifics on how 
this research will be executed are elaborated below (cf. 2.2 Strategy for Analysis). 
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2. Methods 
When conducting a research study various considerations are necessary beforehand. This 
chapter will explain on what grounds the analyses will be conducted along with reflections 
regarding Theory of Science (2.1) and, related thereto, the Strategy of Analysis (2.2) is 
clarified. Lastly, this chapter will include Choice of Empirical data (2.3) and Choice of 
Theory (2.4) to provide insight to the theoretical framework of the project. 
 
2.1 Theory of Science 
This sections aims at describing reflections concerning theory of science and the field of 
study is China. The project’s approach is inspired by Critical Realism (CR), hence the aim is 
to acquire new knowledge of the immediate reality, in this case - China. However, CR 
acknowledges the existence of a reality without our knowledge here of, hence the definite 
truth is inaccessible (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2012: 280f). As to CR, the project’s 
intransitive dimension (ontology) is China and Wallerstein’s WST and the transitive 
dimension (epistemology) is how we obtain knowledge of China. How we obtain this 
knowledge will be elaborated below in choice of empirical data and theory. Furthermore, CR 
has inspired the choice of theory and methods. CR states that not all theories are relevant to 
all research questions. Therefore, different theories have been examined, but only the most 
relevant have been included (cf. 3. Theory). Finally, CR has inspired the Strategy of Analysis 
as described below. 
 
2.2 Strategy for Analysis 
The inspiration for the strategy of analysis from CR lies in the intransitive dimensions 
division of reality in three domains: the empirical, the factual and the deep domain. The 
existing knowledge is what you base your research on, whereas the interesting knowledge is 
obtained in the tension between the factual and deep domain (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2012: 
282). For this analysis, the first analysis will primarily be in the tension between the 
empirical and factual domain, whereas the second analysis, with the following discussion, 
will cover the new knowledge obtained in the tension between the factual and deep domain 
(ibid.). 
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2.2.1 Strategy: China towards Semi-Periphery 
The chapter 'China towards Semi-Periphery' is part one of the project’s analysis. The main 
goal is to analyse how China has moved from being periphery to semi-periphery. In order to 
do so, variables identified on behalf of Wallerstein’s theory will be applied to examples of 
China’s history in combination with its economic development. The first variable applied to 
China is political stability due to Wallerstein argues that periphery nations is the most likely 
to have been colonised, had military coups and alike, whereas core nations have been good at 
avoiding this. Secondly, whether or not China has been able to collect taxes and generate 
revenue - and to what extent- from individual, which, if they are high, is a core-like indicator. 
Furthermore, strong states are able to set rules of both foreign and domestic business and the 
ability to do so implies whether or not the nation is core or periphery. In this case, it is 
elaborated through Joint Ventures (JV) and Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Ultimately, 
different products are analysed. The amount of either core-like or periphery-like products is 
one of the highest rated variables according to Wallerstein (cf. 3.1 World-System Theory). 
The chapter is divided into two sections reflecting two different periods (1950s-1970s and 
1980s-present). To support WST, the development strategies Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI) and Export Substitution Industrialisation (ESI) and its stages will 
additionally be applied to the empirical data of China. Furthermore, it is discussed whether 
the Chinese government has resorted to the Ricardian and Kaldorian strategies during their 
development (cf. 3. Theory).  
 
2.2.2 Strategy: WST within China 
Chapter 5; WST within China is divided into two parts as well. The first section follows up 
on the first analysis applying the Kondratieff Cycle and D. Harvey’s Limits of Capital (cf. 
3.1.3 The Kondratieff Cycle; 3.4 Limits of Capital). The second section is where WST will 
be applied to various provinces
3
 within China. Due to the geographical size of China nine 
provinces from the East, the Central West and the Far West will be exemplified in the 
analysis. The provinces of our focus are: Beijing, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Gansu, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet. The provinces have been chosen due to their disperse 
geographical location and administrative status, hence some are provinces, some autonomous 
provinces and other municipalities, however, this does not affect the analysis due to all being 
under rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (cf. 5. WST within China). To analyse 
                                                 
3 Provinces will be applied for: provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in China 
10 
which provinces belongs to either core, semi-periphery or periphery, five variables have been 
chosen on behalf of Wallerstein’s theory, as in the first analysis. They are similar to those of 
the first analysis, however with some modifications
4
, thus the variables are as follows: 1) 
Political stability: One of Wallerstein’s categories of a periphery state is that it has most 
likely been colonised, had multiple military coups or alike. Evaluating the development of the 
provincial government can indicate whether or not the province is stable (cf. 3.1 World-
System Theory). 2) Government revenue: A strong state is, according to Wallerstein, able to 
collect higher taxes, because of a reliable government (ibid.). However, due to difficulties 
tracing information on each province individual and corporation tax, their government 
revenue is used instead, which includes individual and corporation taxes and also other 
sources of income a government might have
5
. 3) The average wage (of employed persons) 
level of a state often indicates the reached level of production according to both Wallerstein 
and Harvey (cf. 3. Theory). By extension, the mix of 4) products, is a predominant variable in 
WST, hence periphery-like products includes rougher labour for less profit and vice versa for 
core-like products (cf. 3.1 World-System Theory). Additionally, the provincial composition 
of GDP
6
 in percentages of the primary (agriculture, raw materials), secondary (industry) and 
tertiary (service) sector is included. The last variable included in the analysis is the quantity 
of 5) Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which indicates where the central government has 
concentrated the economic development so far. This is due to fact that the establishment of 
SEZs occurred to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and to spur growth (cf. 4.2 1980s - 
Present). The aim of the discussion is therefore to discuss the findings in both the first and 
second analyses. However, the second analysis will be given the most attention, because this 
is where the interesting knowledge lies according to CR. 
 
2.3 Choice of empirical data  
Due to the field of study being China without conducting a field study, the empirical data 
used in the project are to be relied on the work of other scholars, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. To ensure a certain standard the inspirational research is primarily from the 
literature of the course Global Political Economy (spring 2015) at the Department of Society 
and Globalisation at Roskilde University. Additional qualitative data has been accessed 
                                                 
4 Modifications: due to China has one central government and the same information was not traceable. 
5 The financial Times: http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=government-revenue 
6 When discussing GDP in 5. WST within China, under each province, is it the provincial GDP and not China’s 
GDP). 
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through Roskilde University Library’s electronic resources, to ensure peer-reviewed articles 
and alike. However, when conducting a research of China, it must be taken into account that 
not all information is possible to trace and, if possible, is not reliable. Therefore, various 
sources were used to analyse the empirical data. Information on the different provinces is 
primarily observed through: global.britannica.com (based on articles from additional 
scholars), thechinaperspective.com (based on economic news info from China) and 
BBC.com/news. The qualitative information used in the project is confirmed by multiple 
sources. Some are the figures deduced by other scholars, but the main information on the 
different Chinese provinces are collected through: knoema.com
7
 (collected data from the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank), dbresearch.com
8
 (the Deutche Bank Research is responsible for macroeconomic 
analysis within the Deutche Bank Group) and China-trade-research.HKTDC.com (conducts 
market profiles for both provinces and cities in China and base their analysis on each 
province’s Statistical Yearbook). Both sources, Knoema.com and dbresearch.com, have 
interactive data for each province, hence our statistical data and figures will be deduced 
respectively. Furthermore, since the statistics is often illustrated in the Chinese currency yuan 
(RMB) we added the equivalent amount in US$ for a point of reference using the currency 
site currencyconverter.io.  
 
2.4 Choice of theory 
The theoretical framework will be presented below, along with the combination of theories of 
different origin. The main theory is WST but to explain the economic development and to 
explain how and why production move geographically around, we feel it necessary to explore 
multiple theories within this field, however, as CR indicates, not all theories are relevant to 
all studies, hence the following are included in the analysis.  
 
Our main theories are Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-System Theory (WST) and Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) in combination with Export Substitution Industrialisation 
(ESI). ISI and ESI are structural theories, while WST is inspired by Marxism. Normally, 
when conducting this type of research, theories of the same origin are used, however, with 
our existing knowledge of China; the combination of theories of different origin is possible. 
                                                 
7 http://knoema.com/ygjzieg/china-regional-dataset-may-2015 
8https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_EN-
PROD&rwobj=RMLCHPM.alias&ref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.dk%2Furl 
12 
The construction of China and the CPC is inspired by the socialist (or Communist) ideology; 
the Soviet Union and Marxism (cf. 4. China towards Semi-Periphery). However, since the 
1980s China’s involvement with the rest of the (capitalist) world has increased. Though, a 
socialist revolution cannot occur in one country, because “...it must act in a larger capitalist 
system.” (Chirot & Hall 1982: 86). For us to analyse how to categorise China, we see it fits to 
add economic development theories (ISI/ESI) to WST. 
 
Besides WST, ISI and ESI, Gerschenkron’s collective action problems illustrate how China 
has addressed state-level problems such as outdated machinery, unskilled managers, etc. (cf. 
3.3. Gerschenkron). Related to Gerschenkron are Ricardian and Kaldorian strategies which 
are used to analyse China’s efforts to develop its economy as a late industrialisers (ibid.). 
Finally, D. Harvey's Limits of Capital will be used to explain how and why capital and labour 
move around in China. This will be accompanied by the Kondratieff-cycle, which is 
elaborated in combination with the Wallerstein’s World System Theory (cf. 3.1. World-
System Theory). 
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3. Theory 
With the explanation of choice of theories in mind, this chapter will elaborate on each of the 
theories individually. 
 
3.1 World System Theory  
The WST is applicable in the world as it is today, which Wallerstein refers to as a World 
Economy where the division of labour is in multiple polities, which arose in the 1500s. 
Previously, in a World Empire the division of labour was within one political system, where 
capitalism is less likely to occur (Kaspersen 2007: 575f; Schwartz 2010: 46). However, 
capitalism has occurred in the World Economy, where participation “...determines domestic 
class structures, the structure of export production, and ultimately state power.” (Schwartz 
2010: 47).  
 
The shift between the two worlds resulted in a division of the (new) world-economy in core 
and periphery states. Core states signified flourishing cities with high developed agriculture 
and technology, whereas the periphery provided (e.g. natural-) resources for the core, which 
meant rougher labour for less profit compared to the core (ibid.). Wallerstein argues that the 
core’s exploitation of the periphery led to stagnation in the periphery and fostered a gap 
between the two (ibid.). Hence, according to WST, this division only benefits the core states 
due to the periphery being ‘forced’ to produce low-value-added goods, which limits any 
development in those areas. Additionally, “Unequal exchange is a significant part of the 
WST argument”, meaning that workers in peripheries have to devote more time of work to 
get a product compared to those in the core. (ibid.). This explanation leads us to the relation 
to/source of Marxism, in which the following quote demonstrates: 
  
WST is loyal to its Marxist origins: the analysis of core and periphery mirrors 
Marx’s analysis of the dialectical relationship between capital and labor. Core 
and periphery could not exist without each other. Core implies periphery in 
the same way that capital – private ownership of the means of production by 
a limited group of people – implies labor – a large group separated from the 
means of production. The core’s growth depends on exploitation of the 
periphery. (Schwartz 2010: 47). 
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3.1.1 The World-system as a capitalist World-Economy 
The development from a World Empire to a World Economy with a capitalist system, only 
develops “…when the system gives priority to the endless accumulation of capital…” and by 
accumulation means “…that people and firms are accumulating capital in order to 
accumulate still more capital, a process that is continual and endless.” (Wallerstein 2005: 
24). Furthermore, in order for capitalism to survive, a world economy is needed due to the 
need for a large market, multiple states and the institutions within the World-System (ibid.).  
 
3.1.2 States & Products 
Within the World-System, Wallerstein focuses on the axial division of labour, which is the 
relation between core and periphery products (Wallerstein 2005: 28). Harry Bentham, a 
Wallerstein interpreter, goes further and includes the distinction between North and South as 
'the developed and not developed' and if we are to say states can belong to classes, the gap 
between the proletarian and bourgeois countries (Bentham 2013). Wallerstein continues with 
a description of this relationship as “…the degree of profitability of the production process.” 
(Wallerstein 2005: 28). The core, which often produces quasi-monopolies, has a mere free 
choice of ‘production’ (on where to go); however, the periphery with a larger amount of 
competitive products needs to sell themselves in order to be chosen. This evidently leads to 
an unequal exchange and perhaps even plundering. Due to this relation, the geographical 
consequences emerge as well regarding core and periphery states. Core products are located 
in a few core states, but periphery products are being produced in periphery states and are 
scattered all around the World System. However, not all countries can fit into these two 
categories, and therefore the theory also included semi-periphery states which define states 
with an ‘even’ mix of both core and periphery products. Therefore, “There are no semi-
peripheral products. [Semi-periphery countries] trade core-like products to peripheral zones 
and peripheral products to core zones.” (Wallerstein 2005: 97). Wallerstein includes 
different examples of products that have undergone the transition of being a core to a 
peripheral product. The most common of these is the apparel industry which was mainly 
produced in England in the 1800s, whereas it has expanded to the entire world-system by the 
2000s (especially cheap textiles) (Wallerstein 2005: 29). This transition is possible, among 
others, due to the emergence of new core products. 
 
In this project we use Wallerstein’s division of products into core-like and periphery-like 
products using both Wallerstein’s interpretation, which was outlined above, and Schwartz’s 
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(2010) interpretation of core products as high-value-added and periphery as low-value-added 
goods (Schwartz 2010: 51ff). Then, in accordance with Schwartz’s definition of core and 
periphery products, the semi-periphery has products which represent a mix of low and high-
value-added products. According to Schwartz (2010) low-value-added products are labour-
intensive (e.g. garment assembly, etc.) which generates a low income per unit. However high-
value-added products are capital intensive (e.g. automotive) that generates high income per 
unit (Schwartz 2010: 51ff).  
 
To sum up the differences between the different states it can be said that “[Semi-Peripheral 
states protects] their production processes (...) and improve the efficiency of the firms 
inside”. Whereas  
The strong states, which contain a disproportionate share of core-like 
processes, tend to emphasize their role of protecting the quasi-monopolies of 
the core-like processes. The very weak states (…) are usually unable to do 
very much to affect the axial division of labour, and in effect are largely 
forced to accept the lot that has been given to them. (Wallerstein 2005: 29). 
 
3.1.3 The Kondratieff cycle 
When discussing states production Wallerstein refers to the Kondratieff cycle. The cycle 
encompasses the common evolution of the leading industries and adds a cycle to the 
(capitalist) world-economy (Wallerstein 2005: 29; Schwartz 2010: 66f). The best way to 
describe this is though Wallerstein’s own explanation as follows:  
 
A major leading industry will be a major stimulus to the expansion of the 
world-economy and will result in considerable accumulation of capital. But it 
also normally leads to more extensive employment in the world-economy, 
higher wage-levels, and a general sense of relative prosperity. As more and 
more firms enter the market of the erstwhile quasi-monopoly, there will be 
‘overproduction’ (...) and consequently increased price competition (because 
of the demand squeeze), thus lowering the rates of profit. At some point, a 
build-up of unsold products results, and consequently a slowdown in further 
production. (Wallerstein 2005: 29). 
 
The period of expansion and growth is characterised by an A-phase and the following 
stagnation - a B-phase. Further, this development tends to lead to multiple scenarios as a 
worldwide rise of unemployment and producers search for locations with lower wages (often 
semi-periphery countries) in order to reduce costs. Additionally, this puts a pressure on the 
wage-levels of the productions still located in the core zones and thereby reducing the former 
demand due to the consumers declining income. However, a few producers or states will be 
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able to survive this. This tendency, where an A-phase is followed by a B-phase can be 
referred to as a Kondratieff cycle, which can be compared to an up-and-down curve. Though, 
it is important to mention that a Kondratieff cycle ‘ends’ with the B-phase, due to the fact it 
can never return to the same phase as before for the measures that the states need to carry out 
(Wallerstein 2005: 31).   
 
3.1.4 The rise of the states-system 
When discussing states in the World-System, the question of sovereignty becomes important 
to ‘explain’. Sovereignty in its ‘pure’ form means “…total autonomous state power.” 
(Wallerstein 2005: 42). However, between two (or more) countries it is “…a hypothetical 
trade, in which two potentially (or really) conflicting sides, respecting defacto realities of 
power, exchange such recognitions as their least costly strategy.” (Wallerstein 2005: 44).  
  
Entrepreneurs in a capitalist World Economy 
The relationship ideology between firms and states is often laissez-faire, however, in every 
decision states make, they favour one entrepreneur over another. Additionally, a sovereign 
state intervenes in seven areas that are important to the state, through which it affects the 
entrepreneurs/firms:  
(1) States set the rules on whether and under what conditions commodities, 
capital, and labor may cross their borders. (2) They create the rules 
concerning property rights within their states. (3) They set rules concerning 
employment and the compensation of employees. (4) They decide which 
costs firms must internalize. (5) They decide what kinds of economic 
processes may be monopolized, and to what degree. (6) They tax. (7) Finally, 
when firms based within their boundaries may be affected, they can use their 
power externally to affect the decisions of other states. (Wallerstein 2005: 46).  
 
Wallerstein defines a strong state, within an interstate system, as “…the ability to get legal 
decisions actually carried out.” (Wallerstein 2005: 52ff). Having a strong state also gives 
grounds for collecting more taxes compared to a weaker state. Due to states having the 
monopoly of violence through the control of military and police, the risk of a military coup 
depends on whether the state is weak or strong. Hence, military control in a weak state is, 
according to Wallerstein, diluted. But, it is important to state that this is not all due to wrong 
policies, but more because of “…the endemic weakness of state structures in zones where the 
large majority of production processes are peripheral and are therefore weak sources of 
capital accumulation.” (Wallerstein 2005: 53). Examples of this are countries with natural 
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resources that accumulate rent, which tend to go to private hands’ and thereby increases the 
possibility of a military take-over (Wallerstein 2005: 54).  
 
With the fact that strong states are able to exert power over weaker states comes another fact 
that the relative strength of a state:  
“…is not merely the degree to which they can effectively exercise authority 
internally but the degree to which they can hold their heads high in the 
competitive environment of the world system. All states are theoretically 
sovereign, but strong states find it far easier to ‘intervene’ in the internal 
affairs of weaker states than vice versa…” (Wallerstein 2005: 55).  
 
Hence they are able to impose their wishes onto the weaker states (a (totally) weak state, here 
meaning a colony with no directly sovereignty) (ibid.). Conversely, the interstate system is 
dominated by a contradiction, because the strong states are competing, but they still have a 
shared interest in upholding the existing interstate- and World-System (Wallerstein 2005: 56).  
It is in this struggle the importance of semi-peripheral states arise: they  
 
…spend their energy running very fast in order at the very least to stay in 
their intermediate place, but hoping as well that they may rise on the ladder. 
They use state power in the internal and interstate area quite consciously to 
raise the status of their state as a producer, as an accumulator of capital, and 
as a military force. (…) either they will succeed in moving up the hierarchical 
ladder (or at least stay put) or they will be pushed down. (Wallerstein 2005: 
56f).  
 
The competition between strong (core) states and the intermediate (semi-peripheral) states 
leads to an ongoing rivalry within the interstate area and thereby a ‘balance of power’, which 
means that no state will get their will (Wallerstein 2005: 57). Though, several attempts have 
been made to obtain such power through either creating a world-empire or becoming a 
hegemon. Although, none has succeeded in creating a new world-empire, several have 
succeeded in obtaining hegemony and thereby having part of the majority power in the world 
due to them being “…able to establish the rules of the game in their interstate system…” 
(Wallerstein 2005: 58).  
 
3.2 ISI/ESI development strategies 
As stated by Cypher & Dietz (2009: 271), industrialization of an economy is an important 
indispensable component in the process of development. In the course of economic 
development the role of the agricultural sector diminishes due to growing importance of 
18 
industrial and services sectors with accompanying rural-urban migration of labour (Cypher & 
Dietz 2009: 274).  
 
3.2.1 Import Substitution Industrialisation         
Cypher & Dietz (2009) allocate two economic development models: “optimal” who they also 
call East Asian type, and “sub-optimal” represented primarily by Latin American countries 
and India. Below is the table that illustrates the stages of industrial development of the 
“optimal model”, which will be applied in our project (Cypher & Dietz 2009: 331).  
 
Figure 1: Stages of industrial development of “optimal model” (Cypher & Dietz 2009: 331). 
 
So, historically, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) has been a way to transform an 
agriculture-based economy into an industrial-based economy. There are certain advantages 
and also disadvantages of this approach, as elaborated below (Cypher & Dietz 2009: 276).  
 
ISI is a way to start domestic production of products that the country has been importing 
(substitutes). The country can be self-supplied and can even export products because their 
wages are often lower than the existing market. The first step is to produce very simple and 
non-durable products like pencils, beverages, toys, diapers, etc. (ibid: 277). A pencil is a 
product with a limited lifespan which means that the demand for the product is constant or 
climbing. A simple non-durable product is also something that is bought for the most part 
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instead of lent to others, like lending a car or phone to your neighbour. A pencil is an 
affordable product. Since the production of nondurable goods is mostly labour-intensive it 
will solve the problem of unemployment by attracting labour force from rural areas (ibid: 
277).  
 
The demand for great skills and modern machines is moderate because of the simplicity of 
the product. That is very important since the workers may never have had a job before and 
come from rural areas. This first stage of ISI is often called easy ISI (Cypher & Dietz 2009: 
277). In the beginning, the lack of experience and low skilled labour and management can be 
a problem. Accounting, getting the right supplies and exporting does not always work 
properly. However over time and by 'learning-by-doing' this will be more efficient. (ibid. 
281f). To be successful in easy ISI, companies need protection from the government. This is 
called infant industry tariff protection. By not only helping the company, imported goods are 
also taxed so they become more expensive to the domestic buyer. That makes it more 
attractive to buy domestic products than the imported ones (ibid. 289). These tariffs have to 
be phased out over time, because the companies grow and can handle themselves (ibid. 292). 
Without the government, easy ISI is not a guarantee for success and decision-makers need to 
develop new rules and policies to get the growth going. As companies get better skilled and 
the labour force get better paid, more expensive goods will be imported and total import will 
rise (cars, computers and so on) (ibid. 308f). This is a problem, as the country's balance of 
payments will be negative. What is very common among less-developed countries, is that 
primary goods account for the largest part of their exports with manufactured products 
constituting of only a small proportion (ibid: 278). 
 
3.2.2 ESI 
“Export Substitution Industrialisation (ESI) is the logical next stage of evolution of the 
industrialization strategy after easy ISI” (ibid: 313). When the ISI companies have become 
more skilled and can compete with the imported products, they can start exporting to the 
international market. This will give higher levels of income, faster growth and even more 
employment for the rural workers (ibid: 312). At this stage competitive ISI firms export, 
firstly, non-durable products, which were meeting only local consumption before, by 
supplementing export profile with manufactured goods. So export substitution occurs when 
export of primary goods is replaced by export of secondary goods (ibid: 313). 
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3.2.2 Difficult ISI with Secondary Export Substitution 
Difficult ISI with secondary export substitution is the next stage after ESI strategy is 
implemented. At this stage non-durable products that were exported at the ESI phase are 
replaced by higher-value-added (or more sophisticated) goods (ibid: 326).  
 
3.3 Gerschenkron 
Alexander Gerschenkron argued that national institutions play a crucial part in resolving 
collective action problems. This becomes more relevant for backward economies (late 
industrialisers) that need an active state. By collective action problems the following issues 
are implied: lack of skilled labour and managers in production sites, absence of distribution 
network, outdated machinery, etc. Such type of nation-wide problems can according to 
Gerschenkron be resolved only by the state since it requires implementation of a set of 
coherent far-sighted policies. As outlined by Schwartz (2010) the logic of Gerschenkron's 
reasoning is simple: The later industrialisation happened in backward countries, the more 
there was need for state to intervene. Gerschenkron enlisted four syndromes of late 
industrialization. According to him, “...the later industrialization took place: 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Ricardian Strategy 
Herman Schwartz (2010) introduces two interconnected strategies that many countries 
applied in order to stimulate economic growth. The first being that industrializing backward 
countries had to resort to is the Ricardian strategy (named after David Ricardo). This strategy 
implies that as a starting point a backward country has to focus on exporting its primary 
products: agricultural products, raw materials, low-end industries’ products (e.g. apparel 
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industry), etc. (Schwartz 2010: 59). Schwartz outlines 2 conditions that predetermine 
Ricardian success of late industrialisers: 
 
3.3.2 Kaldorian Strategy 
The second strategy Schwartz (2010) introduces is the Kaldorian strategy, the step after 
Ricardian strategy. It is closely connected to Verdoorn effects implying that increased output 
induces higher productivity. It basically promotes the idea of learning by doing: by increasing 
the volume of production the firm accumulates experience and the production can be 
diversified afterwards. In economic terms it can be simply named as economy of scale, 
economy of scope and economy of speed. The economy of scale would mean producing the 
same product in large volumes, whereas economy of scope implies diversification of 
production and the economy of speed is enhanced specialization in production as well as 
process innovation. Just as Ricardian strategy, Kaldorian policies rely on export. This 
strategy is applicable even to uncompetitive firms, which creates a great risk that “learning by 
doing” and high productivity will not be the case. So here the state again must interfere in 
order to ensure the positive effects of implementing Kaldorian strategy (ibid: 60f). 
 
3.4 Limits of capital 
Limits of Capital by D. Harvey (2006) is based on the work Capital by Karl Marx. However, 
this project will only include chapter 12: “The Production of Spatial Configurations: The 
Geographical Mobilities of Capital and Labour”, which will be elaborated below. 
 
Uneven geographical development of capitalism 
A location is both fundamental material, but it is also a social product. The value of a 
commodity therefore also includes ‘change of location’, if needed, due to a number of 
circumstances. Before a production cycle can move location, a reliable transportation system 
is needed. However, to create such systems, a large amount of capital is necessary and few 
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individual businesses are able to take such risk, hence this task often falls on the state or 
government (Harvey 2006: 374ff). 
  
In order to spur growth, the mobility of labour is important, which “…refers to the freedom of 
the labourer to sell his or her labour power whenever, wherever, for whatever purpose and to 
whomsoever, he or she pleases.” (Harvey 2006: 380). Though, “…the labourer is nothing but 
‘variable capital’, an aspect of capital itself.” (ibid.). When moving locations, the mobility of 
labour is necessary in order to accumulate capital. Capital can more easily adapt to new 
processes if the labourer is mobile. Additionally, capitalists need a reserve army of labour 
hence it occasionally needs to be favourable to be unemployed, meaning a support system is 
necessary, which usually relies on the state to provide. This is necessary for capital to evolve 
‘further down the road’. However, the geographical movement of labour can be arranged by 
both the government and companies (Harvey 2006: 381f). 
  
Where to locate production processes is not randomly chosen, hence “The advantage of a 
particular location to the individual capitalist depends on the cost of constant and variable 
capital, of transportation to markets with sufficient effective demand, the cost of interest-
bearing capital, (...), as well as land prices.” (Harvey 2006: 88). These circumstances vary 
from location to location depending on nature (resources), political, economic and social 
conditions which again affects levels of effective demand, value of labour, etc. (ibid.). With a 
superior location or higher technology the excess profit will be momentary. However, in 
some cases it becomes a permanent profit and is therefore seen as land (location) rent 
(Harvey 2006: 389). 
  
The Spatial configuration of built Environments 
“The general principle at work is this: both capital and labour can become more 
geographically mobile at the price of freezing a portion of the total social capital in place.” 
(Harvey 2006: 395). By this, Harvey argues that someone else than the capitalist should own 
the land, where the capitalist production is located. Therefore:  
“Landowners receive rent, entrepreneurs receive increments in 
rent on the basis of improving, builders earn profit of enterprise, 
financiers provide money capital in return for interest at the same 
time as they can capitalize any form revenue accruing from use of 
the built environment into a fictitious capital (property rights) and 
the state can use taxes (present or anticipated) as backing for 
investments which capital cannot or will not undertake, but which 
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nevertheless expand the basis for local circulation of capital.” 
(Harvey 2006: 396f).  
 
This can explain why some areas within a country are more developed than others. Thus if a 
state or government concentrates on developing one are, is it often at the cost of other areas. 
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4. China towards Semi-Periphery 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how China has developed from being a periphery to 
semi-periphery state according to Wallerstein’s World-System Theory (WST). We will 
analyse various examples from history, taxation and the economic development of a few 
industries in China through WST. In order to understand the logics of the economic 
development the following economic development models will be included: easy ISI, ESI 
and difficult ISI with secondary ESI, as mentioned. In addition, to understand these 
strategies, Ricardian and Kaldorian strategies as well as Gerschenkron’s collective action 
problems will be recalled. 
 
Wallerstein points out that a strong core state is a stable state without the risk of having 
military coups (c.f. 3.1.4). In the world history we have seen great examples on how 
European states like Spain has since the 16th century colonised weaker states in South 
America and Africa. Britain colonised some parts of the 'new America' and fought other 
colonising states for the right to the new lands (European History Online). Later the United 
States of America enslaved people from African countries due to labour shortage (Schwartz 
2010: 111).  
 
As for China, China has for thousands of years been ruled by different dynasties and 
emperors and only in the last 70 years been ruled by the communist system that we know 
today. Under Mao, the communist system was very rigid with very limited personal freedom 
and limited freedom in production. Mao came to power after the Communist Party of China 
defeated the Kuomintang (the National People's Party that governed China and Taiwan) 
during a civil war and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. 
Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan and is now in charge of Taiwan only. Due to the fact that 
they defeated Kuomintang, China still claims that Taiwan is a part of China. Though, today 
the two parties have a better relationship towards each other (BBC - China profile). However, 
Tibet region is still very controversial. China claims that Tibet has been a part of China for 
centuries. Tibetans, however, claim for return of their spiritual leader Dalai Lama, who is 
currently living in exile in India, to reclaim Tibet (BBC - China). China’s relation to Tibet 
will be elaborated further on, when WST will be applied within China. Consequently, despite 
of China has had the same rulers for decades you can argue it is not entirely political stable.  
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Undoubtedly, China has had a long history but the most relevant for our focus is the period 
from 1950s till the contemporary time. Below, China’s economic development will be 
analysed in two periods, each of which is marked by a shift in development strategy: from 
1950s to 1970s and from 1980s to the present time.  
 
4.1 1950s-1970s 
The 1950s-70s is the time of Mao’s presidency when China was subject to influence of the 
Soviet communist model of development, which means a centrally-planned economy and 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) played the dominant role in the economy (Morrison 2014: 
2). The overarching goal of the Chinese government was to make the national economy self-
sustained containing foreign trade (ibid.). 
 
During Mao’s rule the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) was initiated which aimed at 
transforming China’s economy from agrarian to industrial in five years. The Communist 
Party of China (CPC) planned to increase agricultural output (from grain production) to 
finance development of national industrial capacity (especially steel production) (Cheung 
Kong Graduate School of Business n.d.). However, the Great Leap Forward policy only 
exacerbated the socio-economic situation in China (Centre for the Study of Genocide and 
Human Rights n.d.). 
 
Zhu Tianbiao (2006), associate professor of Peking University, emphasizes that during Mao’s 
rule the Chinese ISI model took extreme form since the state protected all the national 
industries setting tariffs on all the import products (Tianbiao 2006: 8). The economic 
development during this period was to be driven solely by the state without involvement of 
the private sector.  
 
The disastrous consequences of Great Leap Forward campaign were mitigated by Liu Shaoqi, 
a theorist of the Communist Party, and Deng Xiaoping (Cheung Kong Graduate School of 
Business n.d.; North n.d.). However, soon after that Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) under the pretext of revitalising the spirit from the earlier civil war decades and 
formation of the PRC forces. As a result, 1.5 million people were killed and the country 
entered a political unrest and economic instability (History.com - Cultural Revolution 2009). 
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Thus, in China easy ISI strategy (transition from agriculture-based to industrial economy) 
was achieved by overexploitation of agricultural capacity to spur industrial development (cf. 
3.2. ISI & ESI). On the one hand, ISI strategy allowed China to fund the basis for further 
development and, on the other, isolation led to technological backwardness since no 
significant contact with developed countries was upheld (initially in the 1950s it received 
support from the Soviet Union, however, in the years to come, it mainly relied on own 
resources) (Tianbiao 2006: 8ff). 
 
In 1978 Deng Xiaoping laid out the Ten Year Plan with its primary focus on energy and oil 
industries development by setting out in total 120 large projects (crude oil, iron, steel, coal 
establishments, etc.) (Studwell 2002: 31; Tianbiao 2006: 9). But in order to implement these 
projects there was a need for large investments and imports, which is typical according to 
Harvey's Limits of Capital which argues that the state has to invest in the infrastructure. So 
the state encountered the problem of oil sales being the principal source of foreign exchange, 
which was insufficient for financing such ambitious projects (Studwell 2002: 31).  
 
Many late industrialisers followed the Ricardian strategy by exporting agricultural, periphery 
products (e.g. crude oil, crops, metals, precious stones, etc.) and low-end production (e.g. 
garment) as a way to foster economic growth (Schwartz 2010: 123ff). Ideally, if other 
industries are connected with the export industry and export is composed not only of one 
product, then export growth will induce growth in other industries as well. By exporting oil, 
China could pursue a Ricardian strategy as a starting point to develop other industries. 
However, failure of directing export gains towards development of other industries and 
absence of other primary products for substantial export at this point made it impossible for 
China to move to the Kaldorian strategy and increase returns of large-scale production 
(economy of scale).  In this condition the government had to resort to foreign aid and got 
indebted. 1978 is often called “leap forward by foreign means” and is often considered as 
another fiasco in China’s history (Tianbiao 2006: 9).  
 
This period is difficult to apply to WST due to China’s relatively closed economy and 
according to Wallerstein, it is the relation between countries that insinuates whether or not a 
country is core, semi-periphery or periphery. However, this period allows us to understand 
which state of mind China was in post-Mao, when Deng initiated open-reform policies as is 
continued beneath. 
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4.2 1980s - Present 
Having found itself in a crisis (lack of foreign exchange), the Chinese government had to 
alter its overarching strategy and in 1979 launched reforms on market liberalization which 
meant a creation of four economic zones in the coastal area to attract FDI that was supposed 
to increase export and contribute to acquisition of new technologies; trade liberalization; 
decentralization of policymaking in trade; elimination of state price controls on majority of 
products, etc. (Morrison 2014: 2f).  
 
We hold that the launch of free-market reforms in China in 1979 marked the ‘Development 
Strategy Switch’, thereby China’s transition from the easy ISI to easy ESI strategy. This stage 
gave a solution to finance imports by getting foreign exchange from exports, thereby 
eliminating balance of payment deficit. As mentioned, easy ESI includes export of non-
durable ISI goods with further export of manufactured products. As it can be seen from figure 
2, the primary goods constituted the largest part of export and this trend persists till the 
2000s. Therefore, we argue that export substitution took place only in the 2000s when 
manufactured goods overrode export of primary products.  
 
Figure 2: Shift in composition of exports (in percent of total) (Cui & Syed 2007: 8) 
 
 
China experienced both export and import booms from the start of the new millennium as a 
result of the Development Strategy Switch (cf. Appendix 5.  China’s Exports & 6. China’s 
Imports).  
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The need for foreign exchange in order to pay off imported technologies that were needed to 
foster economic growth is seen as a main drive towards ESI. It can also be argued that China 
did not abandon ISI strategy, but supplemented it with ESI in order to solve payment deficit 
issues (Tianbiao 2006: 8ff). Apart from solving the balance of payment deficit problem, ESI 
could also solve Gerschenkron's collective problems: outdated machinery, lack of skilled 
workforce and managers in production and other essential capacities. By opening up the 
economy, China could become a part of the global economy and get access to innovative 
technologies, management skills, etc. Furthermore, an important event was China's joining 
the World Trade Organization in December 2001 (China Business Review 2011). It meant 
that the country had to reduce and eliminate import barriers. However, in order to support and 
foster development of domestic strategic industries (e.g. the automotive industry), China's 
government made first attempts at issuing industrial policies (Heilmann & Shih 2013: 3). 
These strategies and policies imply that China wishes for better control over its growth and 
production, which, according to Wallerstein, is a move away from a periphery stage. It can be 
stated here that a shift from easy Import Substitution to Export Substitution Industrialisation 
allowed China to move from peripheral position to semi-peripheral.  
 
Taxation in China 
With the liberalisation of the economy, the taxation system was reformed. One of the 
variables that Wallerstein uses to define states is tax level since it shows the state’s 
sovereignty (cf. Wallerstein 3.1.4). The stronger the state, the more tax can be collected. For 
the population of China, the personal income taxation system has developed slowly and only 
recently has started to generate revenue: China has had a progressive income tax system since 
1980 with the income tax brackets that have remained unchanged and are from 5 to 45 %. 
Before the 1980s everyone worked for the state and did not pay taxes. The income tax 
threshold was set so high that less than 0.1% paid tax in 1986. The average income in 1986 
was at 226 USD – about seven times smaller than the exemption threshold (Piketty & Qian 
2009: 1ff). The exemption threshold has been  
 
“...raised from 9,600 yuans [1,553 US$] per year in fiscal years 1980-1998 to 
12,000 yuans [1,941 US$] in 1999-2003, 14,400 [2,330 US$] yuans in 2004-
2005 and 19,200 yuans [3,107 US$] since 2006.” (ibid: 4).   
 
In the 1990s only 1 % of the population paid tax. As Wallerstein argues, the more tax inflows 
(usually) the stronger state. In 2008 the average income was 3,301 US$ and thereby exceeded 
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the tax threshold (ibid 4.) In 2008 20 % of the population paid income tax versus the 0.1 % in 
1986 (ibid. 5). In 1986, less than 0.1% of GDP came from tax revenue. In 2008 GDP was 
more than 2.5% of tax revenues (ibid. 14). So only in the last decades the personal income tax 
system has started to work and generate government revenue. Wallerstein argues that 
stronger states are able to collect more taxes, which can imply that China has gone from a 
periphery status with a system that did not generate revenue to a semi-periphery. 
 
Another important variable from Wallerstein’s theory is the fact that strong states are able to 
control the movement of capital, labour and goods within its frontiers (cf. 3.1.4 World-
System Theory). China founded 60 SEZs in the 1980--90s. They were located at the borders, 
inland, coastal and river areas (Fu & Gao 2007: 4). These SEZ's had certain benefits like tax 
reduction, tax exemptions for foreign businesses, etc. (ibid. 9). Another example of the state’s 
interference in the business sector are the requirements China demands for Joint Ventures 
(JV) in the automotive industry, when it were to be one of its pillar industries. The central 
government issued in 1994 the Automotive Industrial Policy (AIP) to make automotive 
industry a driver of the Chinese economy by attracting FDI and build a strong domestic 
capacity by developing own brands so as to produce complete motor vehicles. Several other 
industries are involved when producing automobiles such as petroleum, chemistry, 
technology and metallurgy. Hence, developing the automotive industry will also develop 
other related industries (Helweg et. al. 2009: 7). It was decided by the government that this 
should be achieved through two stages. The first phase (1990s) of the AIP was directed 
towards laying a foundation for an automotive industry. And through the second stage 
(2000--2010) China were to become competitive on the global market. The AIP planned, 
during the first phase there should be created 2-3 “...large national enterprise groups...” as 
well as 6-7 “...key vehicle manufacturers...” (Chin 2010: 105). What must be noted here is 
that the AIP set certain requirements: 1) Foreign companies can only invest in the Chinese 
automotive industry through JV. 2) The foreign share in JV cannot be more than 50 %, while 
the Chinese share cannot be less than 50 % and 3) Foreign investors must contribute to 
technology transfer, assist in local Research & Development (R&D) attempts, etc. (Chin 
2010: 105). 
      
Automotive industry and Joint Ventures 
The automotive industry has developed in great speed since the 50s. The first automotive 
project was founded in 1953 and was called First Automobile Works (FAW) in the city of 
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Changchun (the Jilin Province, North-East of China). The area was chosen due to its 
proximity to the USSR border, which helped to set up production (Holweg et al. 2009: 19). In 
1956 FAW began production of the Jiefang trucks with a production of 1600 units that year. 
For 30 years the model remained the same without technical improvements. At this time 
Chinese vehicles were at a very low standard and not suitable for export to the Western 
countries. In 1958 FAW started production of cars designated only for senior Chinese 
officials, which were more technically sophisticated that the trucks. FAW had hired former 
Soviet engineers who had visited Ford’s factories in the 1930’s in the US and copied their 
production model that was to place production of all components within the assembly factory. 
During the Vietnam War, China assisted North Vietnam, and made multiple military plants to 
assemble trucks for the war. Afterwards the same factories were made into the Sichuan and 
Shaanxi Auto Works. In 1991 FAW entered a Joint Venture with Volkswagen to assemble a 
low quality version of their Passat called the Santana (ibid. 6). The creation of JVs helped 
China immensely in technological and economic development. In 1980 the production of 
passenger cars were at 5.148 units and in 1992 it was at 161.745 units. In 2001 the production 
reached 717.790 cars (Helweg et. al 2009: 11). 
 
Problems with Joint Ventures 
The JVs have had some disadvantages. Volkswagen who had a JV with FAW saw that many 
of their components being used in FAW cars, and General Motors (GM) fought with the 
Chinese automotive company Chery who had copied GM's Chevrolet Spark into the Chery 
QQ Minicar. Because of lower wages and local production, the QQ Minicar outsold the Spark 
by 6 to 1. GM lost the case in court but pressured its JV partner SAIC to sell its shares in 
Chery. This was the main factor why the German car manufacturer BMW was hesitant to 
team up in a JV with the Chinese automotive company Brilliance but eventually agreed on a 
partnership (Helweg et. al 2009: 31). Brilliance assembles normal BMW models in China and 
sells them domestically. Without BMWs knowledge of it, Brilliance copied their X5 model in 
2011 (The Truth About Cars 2011). Many, who worked at one factory moved to another, and 
simply taking with them plans for design and local contacts and thereby making it easy to 
copy cars (Helweg et. al. 2009: 31). This demonstrates an attempt to pursue the Kaldorian 
strategy by 'learning by doing' even at the expense of violation of patent rights. But it can also 
be argued that this approach should be a continuation of kaldorian because the car companies 
actually are 'learning by stealing'. 
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Today Chery produces its own motor vehicles, however, they are designed by Pininfarina 
(famous for designing Ferraris) and its powertrain is developed by Austrian engineering 
consultants which means they are pursuing higher quality cars by outsourcing to European 
designers and engineers (Helweg et al 2009: 31). Chery vehicles, which are more affordable 
than Japanese or Korean cars, are sold in China, but also exported to Asian countries, Eastern 
Europe and Australia (Go Auto 2011 Chery). In addition, the Xinjiang province expanded its 
automotive industry to strengthen their trade with the Central Asia, hence Chinese 
manufactured cars are of high-quality, but low-value compared to those of Central- Asian 
origin (China Daily 2015). The Chinese car company Geely, located in the Zhejiang 
province, bought Volvo from Ford after the financial crisis 2008 (Sturgeon 2011: 198). 
General Motors also sold off some of their brands after the financial crisis. One of those 
brands was Saab Automobile and was finally sold to National Electric Vehicle Sweden AB 
(NEVS) in 2012 (Saab History). NEVS, however, is not entirely from Sweden, 77% of it is 
owned by National Modern Energy Holdings Ltd. (NME), which is registered in British 
Virgins Islands but managed from Hong Kong, and the rest 22% is owned by The City of 
Qingdao, which is located in China (Saab Owners). When production of Saab will begin 
again, the factory for the Asian market will be in Qingdao (China Auto Web 2013).  
 
State Owned Enterprises 
In 1994 50 % of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were loss-making. From 1980 to 1996 
there was a persistent increase of losses of state-controlled and owned firms (Zeng 2013: 37). 
Therefore, there was a need for more radical reforms in the SOEs sector. Thus, economic 
reforms aimed at privatisation and the creation of companies with mixed ownership. In 1993 
the policy “Grasping the large and letting go of small” was introduced which aimed at 
increasing effectiveness of SOEs by: firstly, creation of enterprise groups from large SOEs 
(through mergers and cross-ownership in the main industries); secondly, supporting mixed 
ownership (domestic and foreign) of large SOEs. As for the small SOEs, they were mainly 
privatized (Zeng 2013: 38f). The main reason of restructuring SOEs was to increase their 
efficiency and competitiveness in the international market so that they could enjoy economies 
of scale. 
 
Geng, the vice president and senior fellow at Fung Global Institute, et al. (2009) argue that 
despite free-market reforms Chinese SOEs constitute the majority among large companies in 
China. The proof that they exemplify is that 70 % of largest 500 enterprises in China are 
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SOEs and they own 94 % of assets. SOEs constitute 50 % of all the enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector and 61 % in the service sector (Geng et al. 2009: 168). Most 
importantly, in such strategic sectors as energy, primary products, infrastructure, financial 
and other SOEs take the leading position (Geng et al. 2009: 155). 
 
12
th
 Five Year Plan and environmental goals 
The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) set the following goals: Environmental preservation; 
gradual move away from the export-driven economy to national consumption-driven; 
development of seven priority industries, etc. The seven industries prioritized with the 12
th 
Five-Year Plan are as following: New energy, energy conservation and environmental 
protection, biotechnology, new material, new IT, high-end equipment manufacturing and 
clean energy vehicles (KPMG 2011: 2; Appendix 1. The 12th five year Plan).  It can be 
argued that China’s government now attempts to direct investments and resources towards 
industries producing high-value-added (or sophisticated) products. It implies an ongoing 
change towards the next stage of industrial development: difficult ISI with secondary export 
substitution, which assumes that more sophisticated and higher value-added goods would 
prevail in export. To support this tendency, figures 2 & 3 demonstrate that from the opening 
of economy China has been intensifying import and export of sophisticated products and 
decreasing export of low-tech commodities (Cui & Syed 2007: 9). NEVS, the company that 
bought Saab, plans to convert the Saab petrol cars into electric cars and thereby following the 
12
th
 Five-Year plan (Saab About 20.5 2015; Appendix 1. The 12th five year plan). 
 
An environmentally friendly industry where China has gained success is in the wind power 
industry. In 2003 there was not a single Chinese company in the top 10 world producers of 
wind turbines. The only Asian company at the 10th position was Mitsubishi from Japan. All 
the dominant companies originated from Europe. Surprisingly, in 2013 four of the top 10 
wind turbine companies were Chinese. The largest turbine manufacturer in 2003 was Vestas 
(DK) with a market share at 21.8 %. In 2010 its share reduced to 14.8% and the Chinese 
Sinovel, which was ranked as the 2nd, had a market share of 11.1% (cf. figure 5 below). It is 
remarkable to see the development of the global market share of the Chinese companies in 
the wind power industry. 
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Figure 3: Share of exports by sophistication, % (Cui & Syed 2007: 9) 
 
 
Figure 4: Share of imports by sophistication, % (Cui & Syed 2007: 9) 
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Figure 5: Global top 10 turbine manufacturers 2003 and 2010 (world market shares) (Lema et al. 2011: 14). 
 
 
Figure 2 suggests that from 1995 to 2005 the share of low-tech products in export steadily 
declined with totally reverse trend in high-tech goods. Figure 4 illustrates the same tendency: 
a decrease of low-tech and increase of high-tech goods in import profile. It can be argued that 
in terms of World System Theory by reducing share of low-tech products and increasing that 
of high-tech China is trying to move from semi-peripheral position to core.   
 
Noticeably, if compared the share of high-tech products in export and import it becomes clear 
they have always been prevailing in imports whereas in export profile they increase in share 
in the 2000s. China has been importing very sophisticated products and there is a trend of 
exporting more sophisticated goods from year to year. This supports the idea of it 
approaching difficult ISI with secondary ESI. As an example, in 2013 electric machinery 
accounted for 25.4 % and machinery 17.3 % of total China’s export (Morrison 2014: 22).  
 
To sum up, in this chapter we analysed China’s economic development since 1950s and how 
China has developed from being a periphery to a semi-periphery country. In 1950s-70s 
during Mao Zedong’s rule China’ economy was centrally-controlled and we hold that the 
government pursued easy ISI. The Great Leap Forward (1958-60) is an example of how 
China’s government attempted to create industrialized society by means of agricultural 
production. However, the consequences were deplorable and in 1979 market reforms were 
launched under Deng. It marked abandoning ISI strategy and move to the next stage: easy 
ESI. The switch to the ESI strategy was to solve payment deficit issue in China and their 
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Gerschenkron’s collective action problems. And in 2000s China’s export of manufactured 
goods exceeded that of primary products. We argue that the 12th Five-Year-Plan with the aim 
of developing sophisticated and high-value-added industries marks attempts to move to the 
next stage of industrialization: difficult ISI with secondary export substitution. In 1986 only 
0.1 % of the population paid taxes. However this amount had reached 20% in 2008 implying 
that China has improved its taxation system but still has not attained core-level. As for the 
automotive industry, on the one hand, they still continue assembling for the leading 
automotive transnational corporations (e.g. BMW), which can be considered as producing 
periphery-like goods. And, on the other, production of complete automobiles (by pursuing the 
Kaldorian strategy), which are ranked as high-value-added products, signifies the fact that 
China has started the production of core-like products, in accordance with the WST. The 
main market of the Chinese-made cars is Europe and Asia. However, they pursued the 
Kaldorian strategy with the slight difference - ‘learning by stealing’. Another example of 
core-like production is wind power industry. Among the top 10 (2010) wind turbines 
producers ranking 4 belong to the Chinese.  Therefore, by producing a mix of periphery and 
core-like products China can be considered as semi-periphery. 
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5. WST within China 
As mentioned, China has experienced a great economic growth for decades (cf. figure 6.). 
This growth can be explained by having two main drivers: 1) heavy industry & infrastructure 
and 2) using cheap labour to manufacture low-value added products (Overholt 2010: 23). 
However, if you take a look at China’s GDP growth after the 2008-09 financial crises, there 
is a remarkable change. In the 90s with the Asian crisis, there was a similar tendency, 
however, with this crisis the growth has not returned to previous levels and remains at an 
annual average on approximate 8 % (cf. figure 6; Overholt 2010: 22). 
 
Figure 6: GDP growth in percentages (knoema.com) 
 
 
They ‘dodged a bullet’ and their growth remained positive, but how can a country, where 
exports are an important element of the GDP, continue to grow when the rest of the world 
‘suffered’? (cf. figure 6) A part of the answer to this question is the Chinese government 
investing in domestic projects to stimulate the economic growth. (Overholt 201: 28f). After 
the financial crisis 2008 China has experienced difficulties to attract both domestic and 
foreign investments. Among other, due to three new labour laws
9
 initiated in 2008, foreign 
                                                 
9 The labour laws were published in 2007. These were: 1) The Labour Contract Law, 2) the Labour disputes 
Mediation and Arbitration Law and 3) the Employment Promotion Law. No. 1's main focus was to ensure labour 
contracts between employers and ALL employees. The implementation here of is though disputed. The All 
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investors sought outside of China for cheaper production countries as Vietnam, and so did 
Chinese manufacturers. Due to the fact, the labour laws also encompassed that manufacturer 
could not lay off workers in descending periods without paying out “...their workers 
depending on their tenure with the firm.” (Overholt 2002: 27; Chan 2009: 142ff). 
  
You can argue that China has reached a point of overproduction of low-value added products 
by cheap-labourers. A wave of higher wages has now made it to China, and especially the 
coastal areas. Millions lost their jobs during and after the financial crisis, not only because of 
the crisis per se, but because of initiatives by the government. Such tendencies often lead to 
outsourcing of products, as explained previously with both the textile industry and the 
automobile industry. As the Kondratieff cycle prescribes, a phase with massive expansion 
and growth can be followed by a period of stagnation, if not averted (cf. 3.1.3. The 
Kondratieff Cycle). You can argue that China’s massive domestic investment during the last 
5-10 years is a means to an end to avoid an eventual stagnation. Here, the central 
government’s Western Development Strategy (WDS) can be mentioned. It was initiated long 
before the crisis of 2008, however, after this extraordinary amount of capital was invested in 
developing China (Overholt 2002: 28). It was mainly the Eastern provinces within China 
which benefitted from the rapid economic growth. The coastal areas have received the 
highest government revenues and exhibited the largest amount of Chinese export 
(dbresearch.com). 
 
The Western Development Strategy 
The Western Development Strategy (WDS) was initiated in 1999, which often is referred to 
as the “Go West” strategy. Its main aim is to develop the infrastructure of the Western 
regions of China, utilize natural resources as well as liberalise the market (Huang et al. 2010). 
A number of economic incentives were introduced by the government in order to attract 
investments in this region. Among them are fiscal transfers, financial and credit support to 
Western China; tax reduction and exemption for companies falling under specific categories 
and interregional mutual aid promotion policies (Lu & Deng 2011: 3ff). For example, the 
companies operating in the field of transportation, electricity, television and postal service 
were to be exempted from income taxes for the first two years of their activity and for the 
following three years paying only half of it (Lu & Deng 2011: 3ff). 
                                                                                                                                                        
Federation of Trade Union saying one thing and Chinese NGOs another. No. 2 aimed at access to the arbitration 
system and No. 3. Was to eliminate discrimination (Chan 2009: 143f). 
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After 2008 new modifications of the WDS policies were made. The Chinese government 
pursued development of certain types of industries in the Western and Central regions: high-
end, environmentally-friendly, energy-efficient that could explore resources in the novel 
areas. In such a way, the following industries were given high priority: equipment 
manufacturing, new energy, new materials, information and biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, 
aerospace and defence (Huang et al. 2010).  Also under this program three economic zones 
would be created in the Central Western region of China: Chengdu-Chongqing, Guangxi-
Beibu Gulf and Guanzhong-Tianshui (Huang et al. 2010; Lu & Deng 2011: 15f). 
 
Why WST within China 
As stated before, when a product or industry is no longer a quasi-monopoly and the supply 
excesses that of the demand, producers seek to expand the labour-pool by outsourcing to new 
locations, where a worker is comfortable with the lower-wage
10
, since it might in fact be 
higher than that of the semi-periphery or periphery level. The producer receives a higher 
profit due to lower costs and the labourer receives a higher payment than he had before and 
thereby it improves the consumer-pool in the new country. This process has been known to 
primarily take place between countries, as Wallerstein explains it, however, in the case of 
China there is another possibility.  
 
...China’s enormous labor reserves, with pay scales radically lower in the 
hinterland than the coast and in urban areas (…), creates the equivalent of a 
country within a country; so instead of Vietnam or Bangladesh replacing 
China as a labor-intensive haven, Hunan will replace Guangdong.” 
(Kaplinsky & Messner 2008: 200).  
 
China’s geographical size is more likely to be compared to a continent than a country 
(Beckley 2011: 56). Additionally, it is important to include China’s massive domestic 
migration. China has the most domestic migration in the world, and between 1990 and 2005 
approximately 80 million people migrated across provinces - thereby not including the intra-
provincial migration from rural to urban areas which reaches similar amounts (ILO n.d.; The 
Economist 2012). More specific, the migration has primarily been between interior/western 
areas of the country to coastal/eastern areas, with people often going towards non-agricultural 
activities. “According to national statistics, by the end of 2009, China had a total of 229.8 
million rural migrant workers.” (ibid.). When Harvey discusses the mobility of capital, he 
                                                 
10 In this context is it a low-wage compared to the core-country’s level 
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states how important mobility of labour is here of (cf. 3.4 Limits of Capital). When moving 
capital or production processes it is important to have a large reserve army to adapt new 
processes rapidly, which currently can be observed in the case of China (ibid.). It is therefore 
possible to argue that the migration within China has very much indeed contributed to the 
economic growth of the country. Among the other contributing factors are the geographical 
size, the enormous population, differences in wages and development in each province (in 
spite of the labour law). The development in wages saw a remarkable change between 2005 
and 2008 (the year of the labour law), however, there remains a significant difference from 
the Eastern areas to the Central and Western areas (cf. figure 7). Furthermore, if you compare 
the intensity of infrastructure, it can be identified that the Eastern China is the most 
developed. According to Harvey, due to of the related risks it is too much for a single 
capitalist to develop transportation possibilities and alike. However, a government has the 
possibility to use taxes as ‘backing for investments’ (cf. 3.4 Limits of Capital). This indicates, 
along with the above mentioned elements, the East is more developed than the Central West 
and the Far West of China.  
 
Figure 7: Average wages in thousands RMB (yuan) (knoema.com) 
 
 
The discovered knowledge in chapter 4. China towards Semi-Periphery have now been 
further investigated and thereby revealed indicators of the much diversity within China. For 
this reason, will the following analyses attempt to apply Wallerstein’s indicators of core, 
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semi-periphery and periphery to three regions in China (the East, the Central West and the 
Far West) with three provinces each.  
 
5.1 The East 
The East refers to provinces located at the coastal areas of China (cf. 1.1.1 Map of China). It 
is the most populated area, though the Eastern provinces are smaller in size than those of the 
Far West (dbresearch.com). 
 
5.1.1 Beijing 
The capital of Beijing was founded already in the 10
th
 century and has remained the 
administrative capital of the country since 1644, except during the Kuomintang rule (1928-
49) when it was changed to Nanjing. Then, with the formation of People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) under the Communist Party’s rule Beijing once again became the capital. (Chang n.d.). 
Due to its administrative status, Beijing is also the political centre of China that houses the 
National People’s Congress, State Council, state ministries, National Party Congress and 
other national institutions. It is therefore important to differ between Beijing’s municipal 
government and the central government, which is ruled by the Communist Party of China 
(CPC). The CPC has the main power in the entire country but with decentralisation, meaning 
each province or municipality has a certain degree of self-governing (ibid.).  
 
Whether or not a province (or municipality city as in the case of Beijing) is able to collect 
taxes is an important element when evaluating provinces. As mentioned, there have been 
difficulties tracing this information for each province; however, we have added the 
governmental revenue, which is 402.7 RMB bn (US$ 65.19 bn) in Beijing. This implies a 
greater basis of collecting taxes, when comparing to other provinces, since this places Beijing 
municipality as 6th highest in the country (in government revenue) (cf. figure 15: Summary 
of Beijing) (dbresearch.com). Additionally to taxes, it is important to include the level of 
average wage. In 1990 the average wage of employed in Beijing was 2.650 RMB (429 US$) 
and in 2011 the average wage of employed workers reached strikingly 75.840 RMB (12.277 
US$) (cf. Appendix 1. Average wage of employed persons). Beijing province has the highest 
average wage among the other eight Chinese provinces of our focus (cf. figure 27: Summary 
of provinces). 
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Beijing’s tertiary sector is firmly taking the lead position in share of its provincial GDP with 
76.9 % in 2013 (cf. figure 9). The secondary sector has fallen to 22.3 % 2013 from 37. 6 % in 
2004 (cf. Appendix: 4.1 Beijing).  As is shown in the figure 8, the secondary sector largely 
produces high value-added goods, such as automobiles, communication equipment, 
computers, etc. (Beijing Market Profile 2014). 
 
Figure 8: Output Share of Leading Industry Groups (2013) (Beijing Market Profile 2014) 
 
 
The different industries are scattered all over in Beijing and in different economic zones. By 
2013 Beijing had 17 different zones. Beijing Tianzhu Free Trade Zone is the only state-level 
zone in Beijing and was created in 2008. It has favourable policies as a processing zone: 
domestic goods get tax refunds, foreign goods are duty free, electricity and petroleum is tax 
free. To be able to invest in the zone one must invest over 1 million US dollar and one of the 
major investors is Roll Royce Aircraft (Switzerland 2013: 10). For Rolls Royce, China is 
doing parts such as rudders and stabilisers but at the same time also do supply-chain 
management (Rolls Royce China n.d.). Another zone is the Beijing Yanqi Economic 
Development Zone which is close to one of the most important airports and has an easy 
access to the huge railway systems - it is easy to get goods exported and major beverage 
companies like Coca-Cola and Red Bull are among the major investors (Switzerland 2013: 
11).   
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Figure 9: Summary of Beijing
11
 
 
We can state from the above information that Beijing municipality represents the core within 
China since it emerged around the current capital, which throughout the history has been the 
main location of China’s capital, long before the CPC came to power in 1949. Due to it being 
capital Beijing experienced early economic development under different dynasties. Beijing 
municipality is mostly engaged in the service sector and produces high value-added products, 
which WST would call core-like products. The fact that Beijing has the highest level of 
average wages (for employed workers), along with a high governmental revenue, is also an 
indicator of it being a core among other municipalities and provinces in China. 
 
5.1.2 Zhejiang 
During the feudal time many emperors of different dynasties resided in this province. This 
province like Beijing experienced early economic development. Already during 206 BC - 220 
AD such industries as porcelain, salt making were set up. And its agricultural and industrial 
sectors only developed over time. After the 10th century Zhejiang became one of the 
wealthiest places in China. Due to foreign incursion in China in 19th century it served as a 
link between Shanghai and affluent southern part of China (Ling 2012).  
 
The capital of Zhejiang, Wenzhou, is called the ‘capital of shoes’, due to clustering of such 
industries beginning in the 1980s, and thereby Wenzhou was one of the earliest non-state 
producers of affordable goods with ‘shop in front, factory behind’ (Wenzhou (Zhejiang) city 
information 2015; Studwell 2002: 35).  
 
The early development of Wenzhou has contributed to the exponential rise in average wage 
from 1990 being 2,200 RMB (355 US$) to 45,780 RMB (7,409 US$) in 2011 (cf. figure 11: 
Summary of Zhejiang). Additionally, Zhejiang ranked no. 5 in China in governmental 
                                                 
11 All ‘Summary of …’ figures are deduced on behalf of: dbresearch.com; knoema.com; The China Perspective 
n.d.: China-trade-research.HKTDC.com. 
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revenue with astonishing 412.1 RMB bn (66.7 US$ bn) (cf. figure 5.1.4: Summary of 
Zhejiang). 
 
The secondary sector contributes most to the provincial GDP - 49.9 % in 2013, closely 
followed by the tertiary with 46.1 %, leaving the primary sector on only 4.8 %, which is 
illustrated in figure 11: Zhejiang province’s main industries represent a mix of both low 
(textiles) and high value added products (machinery, computers) (cf. Appendix: 4.2 
Zhejiang). Most of these industries are located within Zhejiang’s 18 economic zones, among 
which are Export Processing Zones, Economic and Technological Development Zones, New 
& High-Tech Industrial Development Zone and High-tech Park can be mentioned (Zhejiang 
Market Profile 2014). 
 
Figure 10: Gross Industrial Output Share of Leading Industry Groups, 2013 (Zhejiang Market Profile 2014) 
 
 
Figure 11: Summary of Zhejiang 
 
To sum up, Zhejiang province can be attributed to semi-periphery province due to presence in 
its production of both core-like (electric machinery, equipment, etc.) and periphery-like 
goods (textiles), considerably lower average wage compared to Beijing (6th position in the 
country-level rank), 5th highest government revenue and a large amount of economic zones.  
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5.1.3 Guangdong 
Guangdong was the first province of China to get into contact with the west. This was 
primarily due to its long coastline, which is why in the 16th century Portugal established a 
harbour in the province. The capital Guangzhou has for an extended period of time 
dominated the province, due to most of southern China’s trade is channelled through here. 
However, since 1949 the province has undergone some political changes. In 1954 the 
province was altered from being a centrally administered municipality to “...a prefecture-
level municipality under the jurisdiction of the provincial government.” (Falkenheim n.d.). 
Additionally, the province is divided into urban and rural level counties and in 1980-1981 the 
economic management was decentralised due to the communes losing their role (ibid.). The 
climate is sub-tropical and the humid climate makes it possible to harvest rice, cane sugar, 
fruits, tobacco and nuts 2-3 times a year (Den store danske - Guangdong). Being southern 
China’s major trade route has been a contributing factor to Guangdong being the province 
with the highest government revenue reaching an astonishing 806 RMB bn. (131 US$ bn.), 
which is approximately twice that of Beijing (db.research). However, the average wage in 
Guangdong is remarkably lower than that of Beijing (according to 2011 data), despite the fact 
that it also has seen a huge growth since 1990 (cf. figure 14). 
 
As the Zhejiang province, the Guangdong province has almost equal proportion of the 
secondary and tertiary sector when looking at their shares in provincial GDP: 47.3 % and 
47.8 % respectively with tiny share of primary sector: 4.9 % (ibid.).  
 
According to the figure 12, Guangdong’s leading industries is a mix of high and low value-
added products (communication equipment, computers, garments, etc.) However, there is a 
tendency of transformation of Guangdong’s industrial structure to high-tech and heavy 
industries and increase of tertiary sector’s products to make it a regional financial centre (cf. 
Appendix: 4.3 Guangdong).  But today Guangdong is still a large manufacturing base 
(Guangdong Market Profile 2014).  
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Figure 12: Share of Leading Industry Groups, 2013 (Guangdong Market Profile 2014)
 
 
Noticeably, Guangdong province has 20 economic zones. One of these is the Pearl River 
Delta (PRD) zone, which contain three EPZ’s (Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou). It is one of 
China’s most vibrant economic regions and contains 53.7 % of Guangdong’s population and 
79.1% of its GDP, nearly 10% of China’s GDP. The PRD accounts for 27.5% of China’s total 
export and 8% of China’s total retail sale of consumer goods. The PRD started off with 
production of non-durable goods like food and beverages, toys and clothes in the beginning 
of the 1980’s. In the ’90’s, heavy industry followed with electronics and automotive industry 
and major export started. PRD cities produce very diverse range of products: textiles, 
jewellery, software, etc. (ibid.). 
 
Today 60% of the world’s toy is made in PRD. PRD attracted the most of national FDI - 
20%. In PRD different clusters have been formed and the each city has its own specialization. 
The Eastern bank of the PRD produce mainly electronics and the Western bank is making 
household appliances (cf. figure 13) (Pearl River Delta - China Trade Research). 
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Figure 13 Clusters in PRD Cities. (Guangdong Market Profile 2014) 
 
 
The city of Guangzhou is one of the three largest automotive manufacturers in China. Honda 
has a Joint Venture in Guangzhou and exports its small cars to Europe (Sturgeon & 
Bisenbroeck 2011: 198). Later on Nissan, Toyota and Hyundai joined the JV (Chen & 
Unteroberdoerster 2008: 6). The EPZ Shenzhen is the fourth biggest container port in the 
world (ibid. 4). 
 
Figure 14: Summary of Guangdong 
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To sum up, Guangdong has the largest government revenue with the 7th highest average 
wage in China. The secondary and tertiary industries are almost equally presented here 
(around 47 %) while primary sector constitutes insignificant share (4.9 %). It produced a mix 
of periphery and core-like products: garments, footwear, electronics, computers, etc. (cf. 3.1 
World System Theory). This province is the main export-processing base and has 20 
economic zones. Therefore, we can argue that Guangdong represents a semi-periphery 
province in China. 
 
5.2. The Central West 
5.2.1 Chongqing                 
  
In 1891, Chongqing became China’s first interior commerce open port and from 1929 until 
1954 Chongqing was a municipality (history.chongqing.org). During the war in 1937-1946, 
under the rule of Kuomingtang party (or the Nationalists Party), Chongqing served as a 
capital of China (Dictionary.com). However, during the 2. World War the Chongqing 
economy was negatively affected by poor management, struggle between two Chinese parties 
(the Nationalist and the CPC) and war with Japan. However, in 1949 the Communist party 
gained control over this region and in 1954-1997 Chongqing functioned as a city in the 
Sichuan province (history.chongqing.org). In 1983 under the reform of national economic 
system it received management authority from the government and nominally became a 
foreign trade port (Hennessy: 2006). Soon thereafter, in 1992, it became an open city, which 
is defined as “a city or autonomous city-state that gives equal access and status to 
inhabitants and visitors without regard to religious, ethnic, racial, or national affiliation.” 
(Dictionary.com). In 1997 Chongqing merged with Wanxian, Fuling and Qianjing cities and 
became the 4th municipality of China which is subordinated to China's central government, 
like other provinces of the PRC (Hennessy: 2006; history.chongqing.org). Therefore, it 
became the only municipality and the centre in the Western part of China.  
 
In 2011 the average wage in Chongqing province equalled to 40.042 RMB (6.477 US$) (cf. 
figure 15). This places Chongqing municipality in the middle among average wage ranks in 
China (cf. Appendix: 2. Average wage for employed persons by province (RMB), 1990-
2011). Chongqing’s government revenue is also in the middle, when ranking the different 
provinces with it being 192.2 RMB bn in 2014 (cf. Appendix: 3. Government revenue by 
rank & province (RMB), 2014).  
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Chongqing specializes in automotive, iron, steel, military and aluminium production with 
dominant heavy industry with growing share of high value-added products (e.g. 
communication and electronic equipment, computers, etc.) (Chongqing Market Profile 2015). 
Chongqing has considerably industrialized from 2000 to 2013. The share of secondary and 
tertiary sectors in provincial GDP composition has climbed to constitute 50.5 in 2013 and 
41.6 % of provincial GDP respectively (cf. figure 15: Summary of Chongqing; Chongqing 
Market Profile 2015).  
 
Chongqing municipality is the 3rd biggest automobile and 1st motorcycle producer in China 
(The China Perspective n.d.: Chongqing). And in 2013 the motor vehicle production 
constituted 19.1 % of its gross industrial output with communication and electronic 
equipment being the second largest: 13. 5 %, railway, ship and other transport equipment 
accounting for 8.5 %, etc. (Chongqing market profile 2015). So its production profile tells 
that overwhelming part of it is high value-added products.  
 
Chongqing is aimed to become a financial centre and a high tech production base. The so-
called Chongqing New North Zone contains Chongqing Economy and Technology 
Development Zone, Chongqing High-Tech Industrial Development Zone and Chongqing 
Export and Product Processing Zone (ibid).  
 
Figure 15: Summary of Chongqing 
 
 
To sum up, as it was discussed earlier, historically Chongqing has always been a special city 
and under the Western Development Program was allocated a role as a centre of the Western 
China. Chongqing municipality produces mostly high-end products (automobiles, 
motorcycles, electronic equipment). In the country-level ranking Chongqing municipality 
have the middle-level average wages and government revenue and very few economic zones 
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(cf. figure 15). One the one hand, Chongqing succeeded to advance its production structure to 
high value-added production. However, on the other, compared to  Beijing, which represents 
core as examined earlier, Chongqing municipality falls within the semi-periphery category 
since it has not yet reached high level of average wages, government revenue, share of 
tertiary services (IT, financial services), which are present in the core’.  
 
5.2.2 Sichuan 
During 1911-1935 due to the intra-provincial struggle for power between warlords Sichuan 
province was on the decline. However, in 1935 the Nationalists took control until the war 
with Japan (1937-45). Following which Sichuan's economy started to develop intensively 
except for the Great Leap Forward period (cf. 5. China’s Economic Development) 
(Chinafolio.com n.d.). After Mao in the late 1970s, Sichuan was one of the first provinces to 
link peasants’ income to their output and three of the counties within Sichuan were among 
the first to dissolve communes. Before the development of Chongqing, Sichuan was the most 
populous province of China and was in 1997 made a province-level municipality (Suettinger 
n.d.). However, Sichuan still surpasses Chongqing in government revenue and ranks no. 8 in 
the country with 305.8 RMB bn. (4.9 US$ bn.) (cf. Appendix: 3. Government revenue by 
rank & province (RMB), 2014). Though, the average wage is slightly under that of 
Chongqing which was 40.042 RMB in 2011, whereas Sichuan’s average wage was 37.924 
RMB (6.138 US$) (cf. Appendix 2. Average wage for all provinces (RMB), 1990-2011). 
   
Sichuan is a natural resource-affluent province as well as it is a large agricultural producer 
(especially rice, wheat, sugarcane, sweet potato, etc.). Hence, the primary sector is quite high 
in composition of provincial GDP as shown in figure 17: Summary of Sichuan, compared to 
the Eastern provinces of China (Sichuan market profile 2015). However, its industrial 
production has significantly increased and as is seen from the same figure. Secondary 
industries in 2013 accounted for 51.3 % of total provincial GDP in 2013 versus 36.5 % in 
2000, whereas primary industries have sharply declined from 24.1 % in 2000 to 12.8 % in 
2013. The tertiary sector contributed less to provincial GDP than secondary sector throughout 
all this period, reaching 35.9 % in 2013 (cf. figure 17; Sichuan market profile 2015).  
 
Despite secondary industry being the dominant it is important to look at the industrial output 
of leading industrial groups presented in figure 16. Abundance of natural resources in 
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Sichuan predetermined the large share of products of industries linked to the primary sector: 
farm by products processing (16.4 %), smelting and pressing of ferrous metals (7 %), raw 
chemical materials and chemical products (6.6 %), non-metal mineral products (6.6 %). 
Telecommunication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment account for 10.3 % 
of gross industrial output with automobile manufacturing and ordinary machinery 
manufacturing equalling 5.5. % and 4.7 % respectively (cf. figure 16) (Sichuan market profile 
2015). 
Figure 16: Output Share of Leading Industry Groups, 2013 (Sichuan market profile 2015). 
 
    
Sichuan province has 4 economic zones: 2 High-Tech Industrial Development Zones, 
Chengdu Export Processing Zone and Chengdu Economic and Technological Development 
Zone. In the two national New and Hi-tech Industries Development Zones: in Chengdu 
(CDDZ) and Mianyang (MYDZ) the famous companies producing IT technologies 
(Microsoft, IBM, Intel, Motorola, etc.) established their Research and Development activities 
(Sichuan market profile 2015). 
 
Figure 17: Summary of Sichuan 
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To sum up, Sichuan province has long been in political instability (internal struggle for 
power) as well as it was affected by the war with Japan. However, the economy of Sichuan 
has considerably developed since then and the Sichuan province is rich with periphery-like 
products - mineral resources and is an agricultural producer. Additionally, it processes the 
primary sector products (farm by-products, ferrous metals, etc.). And at the same time, it is 
engaged with high tech production. Furthermore, the Sichuan province has been included in 
the economic zones under the Western Development program. So, in accordance with WST, 
the Sichuan province can be characterized as semi-periphery due to the mix of goods it 
produces (low as well as high value-added) and relatively low average wages, when 
comparing to the country level.  
 
5.2.3 Gansu 
This province has long been in turmoil. Thus, in 1862-78 the Muslim rebellion took over this 
province, which was suppressed by the governor Zuo Zongtang who ensured the long awaited 
peace. However, in the 1920s-30s Muslim authorities took control over the province. From 
the 1930s the Communists gained power in Gansu and between 1949 and1954, the Northwest 
Military Affairs Commission was located there. Hereafter, though it retained the military 
headquarters of the region, the province was under the jurisdiction of the central government 
(Falkenheim2 n.d.). Due to the Muslims uprisings and military influence the province have 
not been as stable as others in the region. Additional, the average wage within the region is 
the lowest in the country with only 32.724 RMB (5.293 US$) and the government revenue is 
additionally low at 67.2 RMB bn (10.9 US$ bn), ranking number 27 in the country (cf. 
Appendix 3. Government revenue by rank & province (RMB), 2014; knoema.com; 
dbresearch.com). 
 
Despite of the low average wage and government revenue, the Gansu province is a very 
resource-rich area and has large deposits of cobalt, platinum-group metals (platinum, 
palladium, rhodium, etc.), nickel, magnesium, oil, etc. Hence, the agricultural sector is very 
developed, where they produce wheat, corn, vegetables, potatoes, rapeseed, products of 
cattle-breeding, etc. In livestock farming they breed cattle, horses, sheep, donkeys and goats. 
The primary sector’s share in Gansu province’s GDP is larger than in the previous provinces 
(Sichuan, Chongqing, etc.) and in 2013 amounted to 13.5 % (cf. figure 19) (Gansu Market 
Profile 2015).   
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Due to abundance of natural resources it has more developed primary industry sector 
compared to Chongqing and Sichuan province. As it is shown in the figure 18 industrial 
production of the leading industry groups is mainly concentrated in processing products of 
extractive (or primary) industry: smelted and processed non-ferrous metals, processed and 
coked petroleum, etc. (ibid.). Electrical machinery and equipment amounts to only 4.1 % of 
the provincial gross domestic output, as is shown in figure 18. However, at the same time 
there are initiatives of developing non-traditional industries as solar and wind energy (ibid.).   
 
Figure 18: Output Share of Leading Industry Groups, 2013 (Gansu Market Profile) 
 
 
The Gansu province has only two economic zones: Lanzhou Economic and Technological 
Development Zone and Lanzhou New & Hi-Tech Industrial Development Zone (The China 
Perspective n.d.). 
Figure 19: Summary of Gansu 
 
 
In summary, Gansu province has also been in political turmoil. The territory of Gansu is very 
abundant with natural products, hence periphery-like products and has a large primary sector 
compared to other Central West provinces. Furthermore, if you analyse the structure of the 
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secondary industry it will be clear that the most of it consists of low value-added products. 
Therefore, if consider the facts that Gansu has the lowest average wage level in the country, 
low government revenue, very few economic zones we argue on behalf of the chosen 
variables, that the Gansu province is the most likely periphery.  
 
5.3 The Far West 
The provinces in the Far West consist of the largest geographical area as viewed in 1.1.1 Map 
of China, and is only divided into three provinces: Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet. 
 
5.3.1 Xinjiang 
The Province of Xinjiang became a part of the PRC in 1949, but has since 1955 been 
classified as an autonomous region. However, between the end of the Qing dynasty (in 1912) 
and 1955, the region has twice been the East Turkistan Republic. First, the province was 
declared independent by the support of Turkish rebels, just to be absorbed by China the 
following year. Another attempt was made in 1944 with the support of the Soviet Union and 
lasted until 1949 (Bhattacharji 2012). Hence the area, which is approximately 1/6 of China’s 
total, has been disputed throughout history. Today, the government of Xinjiang has self-
administration and recognize the ethnic minorities within in cooperation with the Communist 
Party of China (CPC).  
 
During the 1990s Beijing initiated various investment projects in the province to connect it 
more to the rest of the country, such as transportation and development of areas rich in 
minerals and oil deposits (Bhattacharji 2012; Hsieh n.d.). Though the average wage in 
Xinjiang not is the lowest in the China, however it is the lowest of the three Far West 
provinces, with only 38.820 RMB (6.283 US$) in 2011 (cf. figure 21: Summary of Xinjiang; 
Appendix 2. Average wage for employed persons). However, the government revenue of 
128.3 RMB bn (20.8 US$ bn), is quite higher than that of Qinghai (cf. 6.3.2 Qinghai), 
implying Xinjiang is somewhat stronger in this variable (cf. 3.2 World-System Theory). 
 
The Xinjiang province has 7 economic zones and in 2010 the capital, Kashgar, got the status 
of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in order to attract both foreign and domestic investments 
to the region (Cllql.com n.d.; http://thechinaperspective.com/topics/province/xinjiang/). The 
development hereof is still ongoing; however, the SEZ has brought enhanced investments in 
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the automobile industry and especially from both Shanghai Volkswagen and Germany’s 
Volkswagen AS’ joint venture (ibid.). This leaves Xinjiang with a large secondary sector as 
can be seen in the figure 21. However, due to Xinjiang being rich in oils, natural gas, coal, 
etc., it is also a major agricultural base with a primary sector contributing with 17.6 % of the 
provincial GDP in 2013 (cf. figure 21). Additionally, if consider the output share of the 
leading industries, extracting and processing raw materials are the main contributors and high 
value-added industries account for less than 2 % (cf. figure 20 (Xinjiang Market Profile 
2014). 
 
Figure 20: Output Share of Leading Industry Groups, 2012 (Xinjiang Market Profile 2014) 
 
 
Figure 21: Summary of Xinjiang 
 
To sum up, Xinjiang has experienced disputes over the land, however, since China’s opening 
up of the market and the implementation of Western Development Strategy, Xinjiang has 
seen economic growth and improved infrastructure in order to attract more investors. The 
primary industry is still of great importance to the province, however, in recent years the 
secondary sector has been reinforced. Due to previously uncertain political situation, 
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production of primarily periphery-like goods, low wages and government revenue, Xinjiang 
can be characterised as a periphery province. 
 
5.3.2 Qinghai 
Qinghai was established as a Chinese Province in 1928 and has since been both culturally and 
ethnically diverse. The diversity has led to multiple difficulties and failed attempts to develop 
the region both through agriculture and enterprise transfer from other regions before 1978. 
Additionally, the political composition in Qinghai,  
 
“In comparison to other provincial-level jurisdictions, Qinghai’s leadership is 
necessarily more restricted by the complex social environment in its ability to 
manage ideas of place and community. Moreover, the formulations of 
Chinese nationalism generally limit the extent and the ways that non Han 
Chinese voices are recognized, and the CCP has problems dealing with ethnic 
or nationality difference...” (Goodman 2004: 298).  
 
These difficulties is also reflected in the government revenue of only 25.2 RMB bn (4.1 US$ 
bn) and the lowest in China
12
 (dbresaerch.com). The average wages, however, are somewhat 
higher, located in the top ten in China with 42.493 RMB (6.878 US$) in 2011 (cf. Appendix: 
2. Average wage for employed persons by province (RMB), 1990-2011).  
 
Qinghai is China’s largest producer of lithium, however petroleum and gas resources, 
minerals, hydropower and horse breeding is also noteworthy industries in the region (Qinghai 
Market Profile 2015; Falkenheim n.d.). The tertiary and secondary sector is still the largest, 
but the primary sector constitutes of 9.9 % of the provincial GDP (cf. figure 23: Summary of 
Qinghai) (Qinghai Market Profile 2015). Additionally, the leading industries are mainly of 
low-value status as can be seen in figure 22.  However, the with the involvement of the 
central government by means of the Western Development Strategy, sustainable solutions are 
gaining impact in the province, compared to the former ‘quick fixes’. Additionally, there is 
established infrastructure and the communication with the rest of the PRC is enhancing 
(Goodman 2004: 179ff). This change especially began in 2000, when the capital, Xining, 
established an Economic and Technological Development Zone, which has a focus on 
chemicals based on salt lake resources, metals and processing petroleum and natural gas. It is 
also the only economic zone in the province (China.org n.d.). 
 
                                                 
12 The db.research.com only includes 30 of the 31 provinces in China in this score, due to missing information, 
hence Tibet might be lower ranked than Qinghai. 
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Figure 22: Value-added Share of Leading Industries (2013) (Qinghai Market Profile 2015) 
 
 
Figure 23: Summary of Qinghai 
 
To sum up, the composition of Qinghai is affected by the many spilt goals of the province 
and the development so far reflected hereof. In spite of recent focus on developing the 
secondary sector, periphery products as minerals and natural resources still plays a vital role 
in Qinghai’s economy. Despite of a relatively high average wage, the government revenue 
astonishes low, which leads to a classification of Qinghai as a periphery. 
 
5.3.3 Tibet 
Tibet officially became a part of China in 1950, after China had launched an attack with the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in eastern Tibet. Due to insufficient army force, Tibet was 
forced to surrender. Previously, Tibet had been a coercive-nation, however, with the 
communist party’s takeover in 1949, “The communist leaders had made their intentions clear 
from October 1949 onwards: ‘Peaceful liberation’ negotiation or armed intervention and 
forceful takeover.” (Norbu 2012:180; 175ff). Whether or not China’s ‘liberation’ of Tibet was 
an invasion of a sovereign country or ‘just’ China ‘reuniting’ with a geographical area China 
have seen as Chinese for centuries, is still disputed (Chinafolio.com n.d.) and the Dalai Lama 
(Tibet’s spiritual leader) claims that China has colonised Tibet. Which have led to the Dalai 
Lama has set up an exile government in India (BBC.com 2014). Today, Tibet is an 
autonomous region of China, like Xinjiang, and is ruled by the National People’s Congress 
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(NPC), under the leadership of CPC. The judicial and administrative organs are all ruled by 
the NPC and: 
 
According to the constitution and the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, 
the Tibet Autonomous Region enjoys extensive rights of autonomy, 
including legislative power, flexible enforcement of relevant state laws, right 
to use the spoken language (...), right of fiscal management. (China.org).  
 
However, to what degree Tibet is autonomous is also disputed. A reason hereof is the 
extremely high average wage level in the province of 55.845 RMB (9.039 US$) in 2011, 
which is the 4th highest in China (cf. figure 25: Summary of Tibet) (knoema.com). High 
wages are usually a consequence of high productivity, the development of quasi monopolies 
and only for core nations (cf. 3.1 World-System theory; 3.4 Limits of Capital). Though, the 
high wages in Tibet is settled by the central government and it is debated whether or not this 
is an incentive to attract Chinese workers to the area (rather than the Tibetan population) and 
blur the actual development of the area (Frost 2005). As mentioned, the government revenue 
could not be traced for Tibet. However the nominal GDP of Tibet is the lowest in the country 
with only 92 RMB bn (14.9 US$) in 2014 and Tibet also ranks last in the share of China’s 
national GDP of only 0.1 % (cf. figure 25: Summary of Tibet). It is therefore possible to 
argue, that the wage level in Tibet is not a valid variable in this case, hence it does not reflect 
the productivity in the province as Wallerstein and Harvey assume.  
 
What is easier to evaluate is the composition of the primary, secondary and tertiary sector in 
the province. The tertiary sector is the major contributor to the provinces GDP with 53 % as 
portrayed in figure 25. The cause of this is most likely the major impact of tourism (Tibet 
Market Profile 2015). The establishment of the Qinghai-Tibet railway linked Tibet to the rest 
of the country and thereby increased the access to the area, though it is necessary to mention, 
that transportation is still expensive in the province due to lacking infrastructure 
(China.folio.com Tibet). Although the tertiary sector is high, the secondary and primary 
sectors still play a vital role in the province. The major industries are still located in these 
sectors and are primarily low-value products as can be seen in figure 24 (Tibet Market Profile 
2015). 
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Figure 24: Share of Leading Industries Group (Tibet Market Profile 2015) 
 
 
In 2001 the capital of Tibet, Lhasa, got the status of a SEZ, including the surrounding areas, 
with the following main industries: medicine maker, mineral development, handicraft 
industry, construction of roads and bridges, property development and Science and 
technology within mineral water and alcohol (The China perspective n.d.: Tibet; Cllql.com 
n.d.).  
 
Figure 25: Summary of Tibet 
 
 
In summary, Tibet is a controversial province of China. They did not surrender as easily as 
Xinjiang allegedly did when the CPC came to power in China. Tibet has underdeveloped 
industries (except for the very few) due to insufficient infrastructure of the region and very 
scarcely inhabited population. The province has seen a rise in the service sector, but due to 
the wages being settled in Beijing, it is difficult to say, how this impacts the region. 
Additionally, this implies that Tibet is not as autonomous as first stated, but the CPC has 
more power of the region than originally intended. Furthermore, the level of the nominal- and 
share in national GDP indicates, that Tibet is a periphery province.  
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6. Discussion   
The purpose of the first analysis was to analyse which category China belongs to and the 
second was to apply the World-System Theory (WST) on the intra-state level in China, where 
we examined provinces from different regions of China (East, Central West and Far West).  
 
Chapter 4. 'China towards Semi-periphery', analyses China’s economic and historical 
development in order to display how China has advanced from being a periphery state to a 
semi-periphery primarily according to WST and ISI and ESI. Chapter 5. WST within China 
suggests that WST can be applied within one country given many nuances taken into account. 
Though, since it is one country there is only one central government that exerts power and 
makes the final decisions on the most important issues. Thereby, it is not possible to compare 
political power of provinces and municipalities. The second analysis, that focuses on the 
provinces within China, will be given the main attention in the following discussion, because 
of our inspiration from critical realism. It is here, the deep domain is explored, whereas the 
first analysis mainly is built on already existing knowledge.   
 
Due to the field of study being China (and not the world as usual when included WST) the 
central government is responsible for all the important decisions for the whole country. As an 
example, the high wages in Tibet are set by the CPC, and not the provincial government, to 
allegedly attract rural (Chinese) workers. However, Tibet only contributes with 0.1 % to the 
total GDP of China placing it as the lowest contributor among all provinces. We categorize 
Tibet autonomous region as periphery since it has a very underdeveloped infant economy and 
poor infrastructure that discourages entrepreneurial activity. Qinghai is as well as periphery 
province, despite high wages. 
 
The WST also states that the wages and national income stagnate in the periphery due to the 
core receiving the main profits (cf. 3.1 World-System Theory). However, we can see that 
wages have constantly improved as it can be seen in the figure 26. Though, there is a 
difference between how much the Eastern provinces have risen compared to the Western 
there arises, to some extent, a contradiction when applying WST: the wages are not 
completely stagnating. However, this can also be a cause of the CPC most likely having a 
shared interest in developing the entire country.  
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Figure 26: Annual average wage of employed persons, yuan (knoema.com) 
 
 
However, as shown through the chapter 5. WST within China, other variables were found to 
be more applicable, hence our analysis suggests that some provinces can be attributed to 
periphery, semi-periphery and (one) to core, respectively. From the nine provinces there was 
found one core: Beijing, four semi-peripheries: Zhejiang, Guangdong, Chongqing and 
Sichuan, and four peripheries: Gansu, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet. 
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Figure 27: Summary of provinces 
 
Thus, in our case the core (Beijing) exhibited a very developed tertiary sector (76.9 % of its 
GDP), very negligible primary sector (only 0.8 % GDP), high average wage and a number of 
economic zones. 
 
Semi-periphery provinces are those which produced both low and high-value-added products 
and had average wages on the middle level nationally. However, the semi-periphery 
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provinces can further be allocated in two groups: 1) coastal with very intensive production 
and 2) inland, economic development of which is stimulated by governmental policies (“Go 
West” campaign).  The coastal provinces (Zhejiang and Guangdong) due to sea and ocean 
proximity have experienced early economic development (Mayer 2010). Therefore, they have 
the largest number of economic zones and serve as large manufacturing bases in China. 
Whereas Chongqing and Sichuan represent inland semi-peripheries with middle-level wages 
and a relatively small number of economic zones than Eastern China. The Central West of 
China is undergoing through intense economic development under governmental policies 
(creation of hi-tech zones, tax exemptions and other incentive for entrepreneurs).  
 
Periphery provinces (Gansu, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Tibet) can be characterized as those that 
have experienced the most political instability (turmoil’s and rebellions) that postponed their 
economic development, such as the forceful takeover of Tibet and cultural differences in 
Qinghai. Furthermore the peripheries are abundant with natural resources and have 
agriculture industries which determine their periphery-like production - they extract and 
process raw materials and have large rural areas for agricultural purposes. Additionally, the 
low wages in Gansu and Xinjiang are in relation with both Harvey and Wallerstein arguments 
when it comes to less developed areas (cf. 3.1 World-System Theory; 3.4 Limits of Capital). 
 
The core’s exploitation of the periphery and partly the semi-periphery leads to an unequal 
exchange (cf. 3.1 World-System Theory). Due to the chosen country being China, various 
information’s, such as trade between provinces is not possible to trace. However, some 
scholars argue that China's internal market integration is still low due to existing trade 
barriers between provinces (Wong 2012: 1ff). It is therefore not possible to include who 
receives the most profit among provinces in China as a result of the interprovincial trade, and 
therefore a variable that is not transferrable to the inter-province level in China. Though, 
when looking at the inter-state level and the whole of China as a semi-periphery country, 
different scholars argue, that the value added in China, when a product is assembled, is quite 
low, being another variable placing China as a semi-periphery.  
 
As mentioned, Wallerstein posits that there are a few core states that produce core products 
whereas there are many periphery states dispersed around the globe that produce periphery 
products. In the case of China, most of high-tech production is located in the Eastern region 
and recently the Central West (mainly the Chongqing municipality and the Sichuan province) 
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got involved too whereas some other areas of the Central China and the Far West mainly 
serves as a natural-resource base leaded by extractive and other related industries. 
 
If look at the concentration of economic zones it is obvious that the production is mostly 
concentrated in the coastal area making the other provinces look backward. WST holds that 
“trade generated and exacerbated spatial inequalities”, which can explain economic 
disparity among different Chinese regions (Schwartz 2010: 46). From the WST perspective 
the Eastern area benefited most at the expense of inland regions stagnating, relatively. As an 
example, the Eastern provinces with dynamic economic development attracted workers from 
inland regions thereby causing ‘brain drain’ from less developed regions (Mayer: 2010). And 
not only attracted workers, but the rural authorities also “...submitted to the central 
government’s direction by exploring inter-provincial labour cooperation and coordination 
program initiatives, facilitating rapid urban economic growth.” (Chan 2009: 136). Hence, 
predominantly rural provinces have systematically exported peasants to urban areas as 
Guangdong. The urban area received workers and the rural areas received remittances from 
the migrant workers (ibid.). This can support the WST argument of development of one 
region at the expense of underdevelopment of others. Additionally, this supports Harvey’s 
argument on the need for a moveable labour army, to develop or move production (cf. 3.4 
Limits of Capital).  
 
However, the Western Development Program initiated by the government attempts to 
develop the entire country and not just the core. By launching this program China's 
government set the goal to eliminate poverty in the inland regions (Central and Western parts 
of China) and unequal socio-economic development between the coastal area and the rest of 
the country. Thereby, it contradicts, to some extent, with the WST argument that the core 
exploits periphery leaving the latter in the same poor condition and not contributing to its 
economic development. Though, due to missing information on trade between provinces, it is 
not possible to view this comprehensively. Furthermore, Deng once noted: “Some areas must 
get rich before others.” (Mayer: 2010). 
 
As outlined, Bentham underscores the geographical division of core and periphery into North 
and South respectively (cf.  3.1 World-System Theory). In China we can roughly observe this 
division for rich East and poor West with Central China in between.  
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We believe that it is possible to apply the World System Theory within China and can in 
some extent explain regional differences (like he inequality between the rich and poor regions 
of China.) when put into the WST. 
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8. Conclusion 
This research project sought out to investigate:  
 
How can you categories China by means of the World-System Theory, 
and how is it possible to apply the World-System Theory on a intra-
state level within China? 
 
China has risen to be the world’s largest exporter during the last decades, due to numerous 
advantages such as cheap labour, large population, consumer market, etc. Hence, it has 
become an attractive place for investments. The main argument of the World-System Theory 
(WST) is that the World-System is divided into core and periphery states. Though, some 
states do not fall into neither of these categories, but combine features of both, which 
Wallerstein refer to as semi-periphery.  
 
In the first analysis (4. China towards Semi-Periphery) we attempted to define China’s place 
in the World-System from the WST perspective. This was done by tracing the change in the 
development of the automotive and wind power industries, which can be attributed to the 
core states, and the transformation of taxation system with a historical background of China’s 
economic development from the 1950s.  In accordance with our findings, from the 1950s to 
1970s during Mao’s rule, China has pursued easy ISI strategy, however, the launch of free-
market reforms in 1979 implied a switch to ESI strategy since they opened the economy, 
which allowed China to become the largest manufacturer. However, it is noteworthy that the 
main industries for development outlined by the government are those of high-value-added 
that can imply attempts to embark on the next stage of industrialisation. In the course of 
development strategy switch there can be traced changes in its taxation system. Comparing 
the taxation system in 1986 with that of 2008, there is an enormous difference: from 0.1 % of 
the population contributing with taxes to 20 % of the population. This signifies that China is 
improving its position in the world system, according to WST. When analysing core-like 
industries: automobile and wind power, a remarkable change can be observed as well. In the 
past, China primarily engaged only with assembling motor vehicles, but now it produces its 
own automobiles such as Chery, Brilliance, NEVS, etc. By increasing the volumes of its 
production, China followed the Kaldorian strategy with modifications - 'Learning by 
Stealing', which can be explained by the fact that the Chinese car companies without 
permission copy motor vehicles of its joint venture partners with slight differences. A 
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significant improvement in wind turbines production allowed China to compete with other 
leading turbine manufacturers globally. Increased level of taxation, breakthrough in core-like 
industries and China becoming an attractive place to invest indicates, according to 
Wallerstein’s theory that this country belongs to the category of semi-periphery.  
 
In the second analysis (5. WST within China) we go to the intra-state level by focusing on the 
nine provinces in three Chinese regions: the East, Central West and Far West in order to 
examine patterns from different geographical locations. Here we used five variables deduced 
from the WST: Political stability, government revenue, average wage, products and special 
economic zones. When getting the aggregate data of the provinces on all these variables it 
becomes possible to allocate a province to certain category: periphery, semi-periphery or 
core. Thus, if a province demonstrated very high level of average wage and government 
revenue (compared to the rest of provinces), produced core-like products (or high-value-
added) and had a large quantity of economic zones, it was defined as the core. Whereas when 
a province exhibited average wages and government revenue on the middle country-level, 
mixed production (of periphery and core-like goods) it was defined as a semi-periphery. If a 
province had the low government revenue, was mainly engaged with the primary sector or 
related industries and had very small number of economic zones, it was categorized as 
periphery state.  
 
We argue that it is possible to apply WST within China to some extent. It is important to note 
here that the second analysis has been conducted not for a general purpose, but to view China 
through the eyes of Wallerstein, in order to explain regional differences in China. It has been 
necessary to create some alteration to Wallerstein’s variables, e.g. using government revenue 
instead of taxation, and not including trade relations due to missing information. Hence, in 
relation to the variables that are applicable between the states the attempt to apply WST 
within China has been difficult. Though, when applying modifications to the variables (such 
as political stability and wages) it was possible to use the theory within the country. 
Accordingly, our findings revealed one core, four semi-periphery and four periphery 
provinces from the chosen ones which is valid to the project.   
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